International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements
A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union

A theory of international courts that assumes member states can ignore international agreements and adverse rulings, and that the court does not have informational advantages.

Clifford J. Carrubba (Author), Matthew J. Gabel (Author)

9781107677265, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 11 May 2017

252 pages, 27 b/w illus. 18 tables
23 x 15.2 x 1.4 cm, 0.38 kg

'Through formal modeling, or game-theory, the book offers a fascinating portrayal of the dynamics that govern judicial adjudication vis à vis market integration in the European Union. The methodological rigor that characterizes the work - in particular the consistent search for alternative explanations - supports the validity of the theory and stimulates further reflection on its practical implications … The complexity of the topic and the innovative approach followed by the authors make this volume a valuable learning instrument for graduate students of political sciences and law, in particular Ph.D. candidates working with regressive analysis, but also for judges and lawyers interested in the enforcement of international agreements.' Giacomo Di Federico, International Journal for Court Administration

Nations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions.

1. Introduction: international courts and compliance
2. A theory of courts and compliance in international law
3. The empirical relevance of the theoretical model: evaluating the hypotheses in the European Union context
4. Preliminary considerations on testing the political-sensitivity hypothesis: designing a control for the legal merits
5. A test of the political-sensitivity hypothesis
6. A test of the conditional-effectiveness hypothesis: the European Court of Justice and economic integration
7. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Constitutional & administrative law [LND], Law [L], Comparative politics [JPB]