Institutional Choice and Global Commerce

Why do institutions emerge, change, persist and die? This book challenges conventional theoretical views using the history of global commerce.

Joseph Jupille (Author), Walter Mattli (Author), Duncan Snidal (Author)

9781107645929, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 29 August 2013

265 pages, 10 b/w illus. 8 tables
22.8 x 15.2 x 1.2 cm, 0.44 kg

'In this interesting and rich new book, Jupille, Mattli and Snidal stake out a theoretically-principled approach to international institutions between pure rational design and pure path-dependency. In their theory, actors are boundedly rational and usually rely on existing institutions or modify them slightly, even when the institutions are suboptimal. But, as the authors show, there are specific, predictable circumstances when they will try to craft new institutions to meet new problems. This clear, readable analysis weaves together theory and empirical tests to shed new light on why institutions persist, why new ones are built, and how states select and use international institutions.' Charles Lipson, Peter B. Ritzma Professor in Political Science, University of Chicago

Why do institutions emerge, operate, evolve and persist? Institutional Choice and Global Commerce elaborates a theory of boundedly rational institutional choice that explains when states USE available institutions, SELECT among alternative forums, CHANGE existing rules, or CREATE new arrangements (USCC). The authors reveal the striking staying power of the institutional status quo and test their innovative theory against evidence on institutional choice in global commerce from the nineteenth through the twenty-first centuries. Cases range from the establishment in 1876 of the first truly international system of commercial dispute resolution, the Mixed Courts of Egypt, to the founding and operation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization, and the International Accounting Standards Board. Analysts of institutional choice henceforth must take seriously not only the distinct demands of specific cooperation dilemmas, but also the wide array of available institutional choices.

Part I: 1. Introduction: institutional choice and global commerce
2. International institutional choice: cooperation, alternatives, and strategies
3. Building Theseus' ship: why the ITO failed, the GATT succeeded, and the WTO emerged
Part II: 4. Creating the first international court of commercial dispute resolution: the Mixed Courts of Egypt
5. Commercial complexity and institutional choice in the GATT era
6. Institutional choice in global accounting governance
Part III: 7. Conclusion: overview and institutional theories compared.

Subject Areas: Old Testaments [HRCF1], Bibles [HRCF], Religion: general [HRA], Ancient history: to c 500 CE [HBLA]