Imperfect Union
Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments

This book offers the first political analysis of special purpose jurisdictions.

Christopher R. Berry (Author)

9780521758352, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 14 September 2009

274 pages, 17 b/w illus. 8 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.6 cm, 0.37 kg

'Imperfect Union draws our attention to an understudied but deeply important aspect of American federalism. Berry demonstrates that, absent strong parties or other mechanisms of control, the overlapping nature of special-purpose governments can lead to severe overspending and inefficiency. Berry's first-rate scholarship makes this accessible work essential reading for scholars of federalism, urban governance, public finance, and party politics.' Craig Volden, The Ohio State University

Imperfect Union offers the first political theory of special purpose jurisdictions, which constitute the most common form of local government in the United States today. Collectively, special purpose governments have more civilian employees than the federal government and spend more than all city governments combined. The proliferation of special purpose jurisdictions has fundamentally altered the nature of representation and taxation in local government. Citizens today are commonly represented by dozens - in some cases hundreds - of local officials in multiple layers of government. As a result, political participation in local elections is low and special interest groups associated with each function exert disproportionate influence. With multiple special-interest governments tapping the same tax base, the local tax base takes on the character of a common-pool resource, leading to familiar problems of overexploitation. Strong political parties can often mitigate the common-pool problem by informally coordinating the policies of multiple overlapping governments.

1. Introduction: into the fiscal common fund
2. What's special about special-purpose governments?
3. A political theory of special-purpose government
4. Piling on: the problem of concurrent taxation
5. Specializing and quality
6. Governing the fiscal commons
7. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], Economics [KC]