Handbook of Computational Social Choice

A comprehensive survey of computational aspects of collective decisions for graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science and economics.

Felix Brandt (Edited by), Vincent Conitzer (Edited by), Ulle Endriss (Edited by), Jérôme Lang (Edited by), Ariel D. Procaccia (Edited by), Hervé Moulin (Foreword by)

9781107060432, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 25 April 2016

548 pages, 41 b/w illus. 9 tables
26 x 18 x 2.3 cm, 1.15 kg

'If readers are looking for a short and concise introduction to (computational) social choice and for in-depth descriptions of essential theoretical problems and computational solutions covering a wide range of topics (voting, allocation, etc.), then this handbook may really be useful.' Roman Seidl, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

Foreword Hervé Moulin
1. Introduction to computational social choice Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang and Ariel D. Procaccia
Part I. Voting: 2. Introduction to the theory of voting William S. Zwicker
3. Tournament solutions Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Paul Harrenstein
4. Weighted tournament solutions Felix Fischer, Olivier Hudry and Rolf Niedermeier
5. Dodgson's rule and Young's rule Ioannis Caragiannis, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra
6. Barriers to manipulation in voting Vincent Conitzer and Toby Walsh
7. Control and bribery in voting Piotr Faliszewski and Jörg Rothe
8. Rationalizations of voting rules Edith Elkind and Arkadii Slinko
9. Voting in combinatorial domains Jérôme Lang and Lirong Xia
10. Incomplete information and communication in voting Craig Boutilier and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Part II. Fair Allocation: 11. Introduction to the theory of fair allocation William Thomson
12. Fair allocation of indivisible goods Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre and Nicolas Maudet
13. Cake cutting algorithms Ariel D. Procaccia
Part III. Coalition Formation: 14. Matching under preferences Bettina Klaus, David F. Manlove and Francesca Rossi
15. Hedonic games Haris Aziz and Rahul Savani
16. Weighted voting games Georgios Chalkiadakis and Michael Wooldridge
Part IV. Additional Topics: 17. Judgment aggregation Ulle Endriss
18. The axiomatic approach and the internet Moshe Tennenholtz and Aviv Zohar
19. Knockout tournaments Virginia Vassilevska-Williams.

Subject Areas: Artificial intelligence [UYQ], Economic statistics [KCHS], Econometrics [KCH], Economics [KC], Research methods: general [GPS]