Government and Markets
Toward a New Theory of Regulation

This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory.

Edward J. Balleisen (Edited by), David A. Moss (Edited by)

9780521118484, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 16 November 2009

576 pages, 23 b/w illus. 11 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 3.7 cm, 1.04 kg

Review of the hardback: 'Governments and Markets is an engaging and ambitious rethinking of the role of regulation in the twenty-first century. The range of ideas and arguments throughout this volume will push readers to revisit their assumptions about regulatory activity and will push fellow scholars to refocus their research agendas to topics such as regulatory decision making and design. Combining strong research with contemporary relevance, the book will be of interest to both new students of public policy and long-standing experts.' Mark Stephan, Washington State University, Vancouver

After two generations of emphasis on governmental inefficiency and the need for deregulation, we now see growing interest in the possibility of constructive governance, alongside public calls for new, smarter regulation. Yet there is a real danger that regulatory reforms will be rooted in outdated ideas. As the financial crisis has shown, neither traditional market failure models nor public choice theory, by themselves, sufficiently inform or explain our current regulatory challenges. Regulatory studies, long neglected in an atmosphere focused on deregulatory work, is in critical need of new models and theories that can guide effective policy-making. This interdisciplinary volume points the way toward the modernization of regulatory theory. Its essays by leading scholars move past predominant approaches, integrating the latest research about the interplay between human behavior, societal needs and regulatory institutions. The book concludes by setting out a potential research agenda for the social sciences.

Introduction
Part I. Beyond Market Failure: 1. Government failure vs. market failure: principles of regulation Joseph E. Stiglitz
2. Effective regulation through credible cost-benefit analysis: the opportunity costs of superfund Michael Greenstone
3. From 'state interference' to the 'return to the market': the rhetoric of economic regulation from the old Gilded Age to the new Mary O. Furner
4. Lessons from Europe: some reflections on the European Union and the regulation of business Neil Fligstein
5. Confidence games: how does regulation constitute markets? Daniel Carpenter
Part II. Beyond the Economic Theory of Politics: 6. The end of special interests theory and the beginning of a more positive view of democratic politics Donald Wittman
7. Public choice: a critical reassessment Jessica Leight
8. The paranoid style in the study of American politics David A. Moss and Mary Oey
9. Law, policy, and cooperation Yochai Benkler
Part III. Beyond Command and Control: 10. What opportunity is knocking? Regulating corporate governance in the United States Mary A. O'Sullivan
11. Taxation as a regulatory tool: lessons from environmental taxes in Europe Monica Prasad
12. Redesigning regulation: a case study from the consumer credit market Elizabeth Warren
13. Origins and regulatory consequences of the subprime crisis Barry Eichengreen
14. Prospects for economic 'self-regulation' in the United States: an historian's view from the early twenty-first century Edward J. Balleisen
15. Deregulation theories in a litigious society: American antitrust and tort Tony Freyer
16. Markets in the shadow of the state: an appraisal of deregulation and implications for future research Marc Allen Eisner
Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], Economic theory & philosophy [KCA]