Game Theory
Interactive Strategies in Economics and Management

A guide to the fundamentals of game theory for undergraduates and MBA students.

Aviad Heifetz (Author), Judith Yalon-Fortus (Translated by)

9780521176040, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 31 May 2012

460 pages, 70 b/w illus.
24.6 x 18.9 x 2.1 cm, 0.98 kg

'This is an outstanding introductory book for individuals who want to acquire basic understanding of current non-cooperative game theory. In addition to the standard material, the discussion includes more advanced topics, e.g., rationalizability, learning dynamics and evolution; observations from behavioral game theory and experiments; and excellent examples from business and economics. Without excessive mathematics and symbolism, the book can be taught to individuals capable of rigorous analytical thinking, for example interested undergraduates and MBAs.' Ehud Kalai, James J. O'Connor Professor of Decision and Game Sciences, Northwestern University

Game theory is concerned with strategic interaction among several decision-makers. In such strategic encounters, all players are aware of the fact that their actions affect the other players. Game theory analyzes how these strategic, interactive considerations may affect the players' decisions and influence the final outcome. This textbook focuses on applications of complete-information games in economics and management, as well as in other fields such as political science, law and biology. It guides students through the fundamentals of game theory by letting examples lead the way to the concepts needed to solve them. It provides opportunities for self-study and self-testing through an extensive pedagogical apparatus of examples, questions and answers. The book also includes more advanced material suitable as a basis for seminar papers or elective topics, including rationalizability, stability of equilibria (with discrete-time dynamics), games and evolution, equilibrium selection and global games.

Part I. Strategic Interactions as Games: 1. Strategic form games
2. Representing strategic interactions with games
Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games: 3. Dominant strategies
4. Strongly dominated strategies
5. Weakly dominated strategies
6. Nash equilibrium
Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games: 7. Cooperation and conflict, strategic complements and substitutes
8. Concentrated markets
9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty
Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies: 10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance
11. Mixed strategies
12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorem
13. Mixed strategies in general games
Part V. Advanced Topics in Strategic Form Games: 14. Rationalizable strategies
15. Stability of equilibria
16. Games and evolution
17. Global games
Part VI. Dynamic Games: 18. Extensive form games
19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction
20. Commitment
21. Backward induction: limitations and difficulties
22. Moves of nature
Part VII. Repeated Games: 23. The repeated prisoner's dilemma
24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results.

Subject Areas: Game theory [PBUD], Business strategy [KJC], Microeconomics [KCC]