Skip to product information
1 of 1
Regular price £114.99 GBP
Regular price £125.00 GBP Sale price £114.99 GBP
Sale Sold out
Free UK Shipping

Freshly Printed - allow 8 days lead

Game Theory

This new edition is unparalleled in breadth of coverage, thoroughness of technical explanations and number of worked examples.

Michael Maschler (Author), Eilon Solan (Author), Shmuel Zamir (Author)

9781108493451, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 25 June 2020

1050 pages, 292 b/w illus.
25.3 x 19.8 x 5.2 cm, 2.39 kg

Praise for first edition: 'This is a wonderful introduction to game theory, written in a way that allows it to serve both as a text for a course and as a reference … The book is written by leading figures in the field [whose] broad view of the field suffuses the material.' Joe Halpern, Cornell University, New York

Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual for instructors with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers.

1. The game of chess
2. Utility theory
3. Extensive-form games
4. Strategic-form games
5. Mixed strategies
6. Behavior strategies and Kuhn's theorem
7. Equilibrium refinements
8. Correlated equilibria
9. Games with incomplete information and common priors
10. Games with incomplete information: the general model
11. The universal belief space
12. Auctions
13. Repeated games
14. Repeated games with vector payoffs
15. Social choice
16. Bargaining games
17. Coalitional games with transferable utility
18. The core
19. The Shapley value
20. The bargaining set
21. The nucleolus
22. Stable matching
23. Appendices.

Subject Areas: Stochastics [PBWL], Game theory [PBUD], Behavioural economics [KCK], Economics [KC]

View full details