Formal Models of Crisis Bargaining
Applications in the Politics of Conflict

The first comprehensive textbook on crisis bargaining for graduate and advanced undergraduate students, and a reference for researchers.

William Spaniel (Author)

9781009318532, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 9 November 2023

300 pages
25.5 x 17.6 x 2 cm, 0.699 kg

'The book is an outstanding treatment of the formal literature on international conflict that has developed in the last three decades. The chapters are clear and concise, and cover a broad range of important topics, including commitment problems, the role of uncertainty, costly signalling and cheap talk, and mechanism design. Readers will gain valuable insight into the role of formal models in understanding crisis bargaining and war.' Mark Fey, University of Rochester, New York

Over the last quarter century, crisis bargaining has become the prevailing paradigm for the study of war. This textbook presents a concise and approachable overview of the crisis bargaining literature, surveying the canonical formal models in the bargaining approach to war. It begins by considering different explanations for war, then delves into two classes of explanation: commitment problems and incomplete information. This textbook is essential reading for advanced undergraduates, graduates, and researchers alike. Each chapter delves into a specific part of the puzzle, rigorously unravelling the twisted logic that causes wars to begin. More than seventy illuminating figures illustrate the strategic reasoning outlined and more than 100 exercises of graded levels of difficulty help clarify readers' own understanding of the issues. Online resources include an instructor answer key and numerous engaging video lectures.

1. Introduction: why war? Part I. Complete Information Models: 2. War's inefficiency puzzle
3. Power and commitment problems
4. Preventive war and bargaining over power
5. Hidden commitment problems
Part II. Incomplete Information Models: 6. Uncertainty over costs
7. Uncertainty over power
8. Cheap talk and incentives to misrepresent
9. Military mobilizations and costly signals
10. Manipulating the peace premium
11. Mechanism design
12. Fighting and learning
Part III. Appendices: 13. Discounting
14. Derivatives of implicit functions
15. Mechanism design primer.

Subject Areas: International relations [JPS]