Evolution of the Social Contract

This new edition further develops the application of evolutionary game theory to an analysis of the origins of social contracts.

Brian Skyrms (Author)

9781107077287, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 30 October 2014

166 pages, 5 b/w illus. 1 table
21.8 x 14 x 1.5 cm, 0.34 kg

'This second edition is an important update of Brian Skyrms' important book. Game theorists in evolutionary biology, economics and philosophy will continue to profit from, and enjoy, Skyrms' groundbreaking work.' Elliott Sober, University of Wisconsin, Madison

In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory.

Preface to the second edition
Preface to the original edition
Acknowledgments
1. Sex and justice
2. Fairness and commitment
3. Mutual aid
4. Correlated convention
5. The evolution of meaning
Postscript
Notes
References
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of science [PDA], Political science & theory [JPA]