Error and Inference
Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science

Explores the nature of error and inference, drawing on exchanges on experimental reasoning, reliability, and the objectivity of science.

Deborah G. Mayo (Edited by), Aris Spanos (Edited by)

9780521880084, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 26 October 2009

438 pages, 12 b/w illus. 4 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 2.9 cm, 0.73 kg

'This is a wonderful volume. It contains original and stimulating essays by leading figures from both philosophy and statistics on notions of evidence and testing; on how these interact with ideas about causation, explanation, and scientific rationality; and much more besides. The volume also features detailed and illuminating exchanges between the contributors. A must-read for anyone with an interest in these topics.' Jim Woodward, California Institute of Technology

Although both philosophers and scientists are interested in how to obtain reliable knowledge in the face of error, there is a gap between their perspectives that has been an obstacle to progress. By means of a series of exchanges between the editors and leaders from the philosophy of science, statistics and economics, this volume offers a cumulative introduction connecting problems of traditional philosophy of science to problems of inference in statistical and empirical modelling practice. Philosophers of science and scientific practitioners are challenged to reevaluate the assumptions of their own theories - philosophical or methodological. Practitioners may better appreciate the foundational issues around which their questions revolve and thereby become better 'applied philosophers'. Conversely, new avenues emerge for finally solving recalcitrant philosophical problems of induction, explanation and theory testing.

Part I. Introduction and Background: 1. Philosophy of methodological practice Deborah Mayo
2. Error statistical philosophy Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos
Part II: 3. Severe testing, error statistics, and the growth of theoretical knowledge Deborah Mayo
Part III: 4. Can scientific theories be warranted? Alan Chalmers
5. Can scientific theories be warranted with severity? Exchanges with Alan Chalmers Deborah Mayo
Part IV: 6. Critical rationalism, explanation and severe tests Alan Musgrave
7. Towards progressive critical rationalism: exchanges with Alan Musgrave Deborah Mayo
Part V: 8. Error, tests and theory-confirmation John Worrall
9. Has Worrall saved his theory (on ad hoc saves) in a non ad hoc manner? Exchanges with Worrall Deborah Mayo
Part VI: 10. Mill's sins, or Mayo's errors? Peter Achinstein
11. Sins of the Bayesian epistemologist: exchanges with Achinstein Deborah Mayo
Part VII: 12. Theory testing in economics and the error statistical perspective Aris Spanos
Part VIII: 13. Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference Deborah Mayo and David Cox
14. Objectivity and conditionality in Frequentist inference David Cox and Deborah Mayo
15. An error in the argument from WCP and S to the SLP Deborah Mayo
16. On a new philosophy of Frequentist inference: exchanges with Cox and Mayo Aris Spanos
Part IX: 17. Explanation and truth Clark Glymour
18. Explanation and testing: exchanges with Glymour Deborah Mayo
19. Graphical causal modeling and error statistics: exchanges with Glymour Aris Spanos
Part X: 20. Legal epistemology: the anomaly of affirmative defenses Larry Laudan
21. Error and the law: exchanges with Laudan Deborah Mayo.

Subject Areas: Philosophy of science [PDA], Probability & statistics [PBT], Economic statistics [KCHS]