Emotion and Object

A study in the philosophy of mind and the debate about emotions, objects and man.

John R. S. Wilson (Author)

9780521114776, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 25 June 2009

204 pages
21.6 x 14 x 1.2 cm, 0.27 kg

A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural difference – causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences.

Preface
1. Introduction
2. Causal relations
3. Non-contingent relations
4. Kenny's aim
5. Kenny's arguments
6. Objects: delimitation of scope
7. Objects: logico-grammatical criteria
8. Objects: two methods of approach
9. Emotion and object: reactions to events
10. Emotion and object: the general condition
11. Emotion and object: some residual problems
12. Immediacy and incorrigibility
13. First-person privilege
14. Attention and object
15. Intentionality
16. Some interpretative problems
17. The extensional approach
18. Conclusion
Bibliography
Index.

Subject Areas: Philosophy [HP]