Elite Conflicts and the Path to Economic Decentralization

This Element sheds light on the intriguing political dynamics underlying the economic decentralization in China.

Dong Zhang (Author), Mingxing Liu (Author), Victor Shih (Author)

9781009544801, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 30 January 2025

106 pages
22.9 x 15.2 x 0.8 cm, 0.293 kg

Why would a politically centralized state embark on the path of economic decentralization? This Element delves into the political origin of the puzzling economic decentralization in mainland China. The authors contend that the intra-elite conflicts between the authoritarian ruler and the ruling elites within the state prompted the ruler to pursue decentralization as a strategy to curb the influence wielded by the ruling elites. By examining the composition of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee, they find that the Cultural Revolution, fueled by elite conflicts, shifted the elite selectorate's composition from favoring central agencies to favoring local interests. Subsequent low turnover reinforced this shift, aligning elite incentives with decentralization policies and committing the Chinese leadership to a decentralized path in the 1980s. Additionally, Taiwan's economic liberalization under the Kuomintang's authoritarian rule provides further evidence of the link between ruling party elite composition and economic policy orientation.

1. Introduction
2. The Political Economy of Economic Decentralization
3. Mainland
4. Taiwan
5. Concluding Remarks.

Subject Areas: Economics [KC]