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Economic Organizations as Games
Ken Binmore (Edited by), K Binmore (Author), Partha Dasgupta (Edited by)
9780631168881, Wiley
Paperback / softback, published 25 May 1989
228 pages
22.7 x 15.4 x 1.2 cm, 0.369 kg
"This volume brings together a number of important recent papers on game theory and its application to imperfect competition and incentives". Alan Brandenburger, Economica "Like all good collections, it has the virtue of providing the non-specialist with an up-to-date review of the literature. The book is well produced and contains a very good bibliography". R.Rothschild, British Book News
Economists have in recent years found the theory of games to be an attractive route for exploring imperfectly competitive markets. In this collection of articles, some of the best minds in contemporary economics on both sides of the Atlantic xplore both the potential and the limitations of this theoretical framework. In a lengthy introduction, the editors conduct a comprehensive survey of the hypothesis of game theory and its goals which provides a unique perspective on the subject. At the same time, they warn the theory is not sufficiently well developed to provide an analysis of all games. The papers which follow fall into three sections: equilibrium theory, imperfect competition and the design of organizations. Together they explore and illustrate many aspects of the economic application of game theory in industrial organization.
Preface vii Acknowledgements viii INTRODUCTION Game Theory: A Survey PART I EQUILIBRIUM THEORY 1 The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 2 The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, PART II IMPERFECT COMPETITION 3 On the Rate of Convergence of Oligopoly Equilibria in Large Markets: An Example 4 Natural Oligopolies 5 Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation 6 The Theory of Technological Competition 7 Strategic Considerations in Invention and Innovation: The Case of Natural Resources PART III THE DESIGN OF ORGANIZATIONS 8 On the Revelation Principle under Complete and Incomplete Information 9 Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents Index 215
K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta 1
I: Theory
P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin 49
II: Applications
P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin 83
P. Dasgupta and Y. Ushio 103
A. Shaked and J. Sutton 107
A. Shaked and J. Sutton 125
P. Dasgupta 139
P. Dasgupta, R. Gilbert and J. E. Stiglitz 165
R Repullo
D. Mookherjee 197
Subject Areas: Economics [KC]
