Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes
Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective

Thomas B. Pepinsky examines how coalitions and capital mobility in Indonesia and Malaysia shape the links between financial crises and regime change.

Thomas B. Pepinsky (Author)

9780521744386, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 17 August 2009

346 pages, 17 b/w illus. 31 tables
22.6 x 15 x 2.3 cm, 0.48 kg

'As against all the ad hoc and ad hominem accounts of Suharto and Mahathir, and against the false promise of a narrowly institutionalist analysis, Pepinsky's close and careful comparative study of economic crises and regime transitions in Southeast Asia demonstrates the abiding importance of understanding the complex interplay of economic interests for explaining policy choices and political outcomes. This kind of emphasis on social forces and the social embeddedness of policies and politics is long overdue and extremely welcome.' John T. Sidel, London School of Economics and Political Science

Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.

1. Crises, adjustment, and transitions
2. Coalitional sources of adjustment and regime survival
3. Authoritarian support coalitions: comparing Indonesia and Malaysia
4. Adjustment policy in Indonesia, June 1997–May 1998
5. Adjustment policy in Malaysia, June 1997–December 1999
6. Authoritarian breakdown in Indonesia
7. Authoritarian stability in Malaysia
8. Cross-national perspectives
9. Conclusions.

Subject Areas: Comparative politics [JPB], Politics & government [JP]