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Dominance Through Division
Group-Based Clientelism in Japan
Explains why the politics of Japan is dominated by a single party: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Amy Catalinac (Author)
9781009588508, Cambridge University Press
Hardback, published 6 March 2025
390 pages
22.9 x 15.2 x 2.5 cm, 0.672 kg
'An impressive blend of a compelling question, keen theoretical insights, creative empirical work, and deep case knowledge. In conversation with a broader literature on clientelism under democracy, Catalinac shows how dominant parties can turn the democratic tables on voters – making voters compete for the favor of politicians.' Allen Hicken, University of Michigan
The governance of Japan presents a puzzle: it is a democracy yet is dominated by a single party that wins almost all elections. Stanger still, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its policies are not particularly popular with voters. How has this situation arisen, and how is it sustained? Amy Catalinac argues that when politicians compete in electoral districts with discernible voter groups, they can make allocations of central government resources contingent on how those groups vote. Using a wealth of quantitative and qualitative data spanning 1980-2014, Catalinac shows that LDP politicians have been doing just that, leveraging their dominance to make groups compete for resources. Dominance Through Division sheds new light on why the LDP has remained in power for so long, why opposition parties are weak, and why policy preferences do not always align with vote choice. It also explains why Japan's 1994 electoral reform has had limited impact.
1. Introduction
2. The enduring success of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party
3. A theory of group-based clientelism
4. Second prize is a set of steak knives
5. Perfect storm conditions for tournaments in Japan
6. How politicians tie money to electoral support
7. Which electoral districts get more money and why
8. How tournaments impact decisions to vote
9. Conclusion
10. Appendix
Bibliography.
Subject Areas: Comparative politics [JPB]
