Domestic Law Goes Global
Legal Traditions and International Courts

This book examines how domestic legal traditions influence states' commitments to international courts.

Sara McLaughlin Mitchell (Author), Emilia Justyna Powell (Author)

9781107004160, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 14 April 2011

278 pages, 9 b/w illus. 30 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.7 cm, 0.54 kg

'This is an exciting and original contribution to understanding ways that domestic politics and institutions influence international relations. Using lay language but rigorous methods, Mitchell and Powell show that states struggle to influence international legal institutions to reflect their own legal traditions. These scholars point out that modelling international courts on domestic legal systems serves to reduce the perceived uncertainty states face when they delegate adjudicative powers to such courts. Theirs is a new and powerful argument, and it will stimulate valuable debate about why it is that states prefer to create and join international institutions in their own image.' Beth A. Simmons, Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs, Harvard University

International courts have proliferated in the international system, with over one hundred judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in existence today. This book develops a rational legal design theory of international adjudication in order to explain the variation in state support for international courts. Initial negotiators of new courts, 'originators', design international courts in ways that are politically and legally optimal. States joining existing international courts, 'joiners', look to the legal rules and procedures to assess the courts' ability to be capable, fair and unbiased. The authors demonstrate that the characteristics of civil law, common law and Islamic law influence states' acceptance of the jurisdiction of international courts, the durability of states' commitments to international courts, and the design of states' commitments to the courts. Furthermore, states strike cooperative agreements most effectively in the shadow of an international court that operates according to familiar legal principles and rules.

1. The creation and expansion of international courts
2. Major legal traditions of the world
3. A rational legal design theory of international adjudication
4. Domestic legal traditions and the creation of the International Criminal Court
5. Domestic legal traditions and state support for the World Court
6. The rational design of state commitments to international courts
7. The consequences of support for international courts
8. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: International organisations & institutions [LBBU], International economic & trade law [LBBM], United Nations & UN agencies [JPSN1], International relations [JPS]