Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract
The Competitive Transformation of Network Industries in the United States

This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies termed 'deregulatory takings' that threaten private property in network industries without compensation.

J. Gregory Sidak (Author), Daniel F. Spulber (Author)

9780521591591, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 28 November 1997

656 pages, 2 b/w illus.
22.9 x 15.2 x 4 cm, 1.13 kg

"Sidak and Spulber's book is clearly written, accessible, and timely, especially given the debate over deregulation that has been brewing for nearly twenty years. It is also provocative and controversial, as the micropolitics of the deregulation debate might suggest....their book challenges us to think about how the costs of regulatory transformation should be allocated among stakeholders." Jim Rossi, Texas Law Review

This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy the value of private property in network industries without any accompanying payment of just compensation, policies that are termed 'deregulatory takings'. The authors further consider the problem of renegotiation of the regulatory contract, which changes the terms and conditions of operation of utility companies. They argue that constitutional protections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for contractual breach, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of the network industries. The benefits of competition do not stem from government regulations that redistribute income from utility investors to customers, nor do such benefits stem from regulatory policies for network access that promote free riding on incumbent facilities by entrants. Such actions represent a new version of increased regulation, not deregulation.

Preface
1. The nature of the controversy
2. Deregulation and network pricing
3. Quarantines and quagmires
4. The regulatory contract
5. Remedies for breach of the regulatory contract
6. Takings and the property of the regulated utility
7. Just compensation for deregulatory takings
8. The efficient component-pricing rule
9. The market-determined efficient component-pricing rule
10. Answering the critics of efficient component-pricing
11. The equivalence rule
12. TSLRIC pricing and the fallacy of forward-looking costs
13. Deregulatory takings and efficient capital markets
14. Limiting principles for stranded cost recovery
15. Deregulation and managed competition in network industries
16. The tragedy of the telecommons
References
Indices.

Subject Areas: Microeconomics [KCC]