Deontic Morality and Control

This book analyses whether determinism or indeterminism is compatible with moral obligation, right or wrong.

Ishtiyaque Haji (Author)

9780521813877, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 18 July 2002

304 pages
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.7 cm, 0.58 kg

'rigorous and thought-provoking work, … Haji's arguments are meticulous and intriguing and I found much in the work in which I agreed. … Haji has addressed a problem that has not received sufficient attention. For whilst the literature on control and responsibility is huge, far less has been said about control and deontic morality.' Philosophical Writings

This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified.

Acknowledgements
1. Introduction
Part I. Determinism and Deontic Morality: 2. Obligation and control
3. Frankfurt-type cases and deontic control
4. Control requirements of deontic anchors: some objections
5. Determinism and deontic anchors
Part II. Indeterminism and Deontic Morality: 6. Transition: from determinism to indeterminism
7. Robust modest R-libertarianism and luck
8. Robust model R-libertarianism and deontic anchors
Part III. Consequences of Being Deprived of Deontic Anchors: 9. The significance of the possibility of being without deontic anchors
10. Determinism, deontic anchors and appraisability
11. Virtue ethics without metaphysical freedom
12. On the connection between morality's dethronement and deontic anchors
13. Concluding remarks
Notes
Glossary and list of principles
References
Index.

Subject Areas: Ethics & moral philosophy [HPQ]