Democracy, Dictatorship, and Default
Urban-Rural Bias and Economic Crises across Regimes

Politicians default on international debts to please key political supporters, depending on their capacity for voting or revolt.

Cameron Ballard-Rosa (Author)

9781108836494, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 13 August 2020

208 pages, 5 b/w illus. 7 tables
16 x 23.5 x 1 cm, 0.44 kg

'This book is a landmark in the study of international finance. Ballard-Rosa uses formal theory, statistical analysis, and case studies to explain why some types of governments are more likely than others to default on external debts. His work exposes fundamental differences between democracies and autocracies, and it shows how levels of urbanization and reliance on food imports affect the probability of default in these two political systems. His work offers the most comprehensive and convincing study to date about the effect of domestic politics on foreign debt.' Michael Tomz, Stanford University

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that, in the coming years, more than fifty countries are at risk of default. Yet we understand little about the political determinants of this decision to renege on promises to international creditors. This book develops and tests a unified theory of how domestic politics explains sovereign default across dictatorships and democracies. Professor Ballard-Rosa argues that both democratic and autocratic governments will choose to default when it is necessary for political survival; however, regime type has a significant impact on what specific kinds of threats leaders face. While dictatorships are concerned with avoiding urban riots, democratic governments are concerned with losing elections, in particular the support of rural voting blocs. Using cross-national data and historical case studies, Ballard-Rosa shows that leaders under each regime type are more likely to default when doing so allows them to keep funding costly policies supporting critical bases of support.

1. Introduction
2. Political survival, mass politics, and sovereign default
3. Regime-contingent biases and sovereign default, 1960–2009
4. Default pressures in closed versus electoral autocracy: Zambia and Malaysia
5. Default pressures in consolidated versus contentious democracy: Costa Rica and Jamaica
6. Urban-rural pressures across regime types: the case of Turkey
7. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], Comparative politics [JPB]