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Deciding to Intervene
The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy
James M. Scott (Edited by)
9780822317890
Paperback / softback, published 30 May 1996
352 pages, 4 figures, 3 tables
22.6 x 15.2 x 1.9 cm, 0.635 kg
Using a comparative case study method, Scott examines the historical, intellectual, and ideological origins of the Reagan Doctrine as it was applied to Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Scott draws on many previously unavailable government documents and a wide range of primary material to show both how this policy in particular, and American foreign policy in general, emerges from the complex, shifting interactions between the White House, Congress, bureaucratic agencies, and groups and individuals from the private sector.
In evaluating the origins and consequences of the Reagan Doctrine, Deciding to Intervene synthesizes the lessons that can be learned from the Reagan administration’s policy and places them within the broad perspective of foreign policy-making today. Scott’s measured treatment of this sensitive and important topic will be welcomed by scholars in policy studies, international affairs, political science, and history, as well as by any reader with an interest in the formation of American foreign policy.
Preface ix
1. Introduction 1
2. The Reagan Doctrine: Challenging the Soviet Union in the Third World 14
3. Afghanistan: Consensus, Cooperation, and the Quest for "
Rollback"
40
4. Cambodia: Disinterest, Dual Tracks, and the Search for a Settlement 82
5. Angola: Dissensus, Competing Agendas, and the Struggle over Constructive Engagement 112
6. Nicaraguas: Polarization, Stalemate, and the Contra War 152
7. Mozambique: Factions, Fights, and the Rejection of the Reagan Doctrine 193
8. Conclusions: The Nature and Lessons of the Reagan Doctrine 213
Notes 255
References 269
Index 317