Decentralized Authoritarianism in China
The Communist Party's Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era

This book examines how the Chinese Communist Party's management of local officials perpetuates a decentralized authoritarian regime.

Pierre F. Landry (Author)

9781107405240, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 19 July 2012

316 pages
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.8 cm, 0.47 kg

'For anyone interested in understanding China's enduring authoritarianism and the mechanisms that hold the system together and yet create mobility among key political actors, this book is a must-read. It represents a major contribution to the field of China studies, but will also be of interest to neighbouring social science disciplines.' Journal of China Quarterly

China, like many authoritarian regimes, struggles with the tension between the need to foster economic development by empowering local officials and the regime's imperative to control them politically. Landry explores how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) manages local officials in order to meet these goals and perpetuate an unusually decentralized authoritarian regime. Using unique data collected at the municipal, county, and village level, Landry examines in detail how the promotion mechanisms for local cadres have allowed the CCP to reward officials for the development of their localities without weakening political control. His research shows that the CCP's personnel management system is a key factor in explaining China's enduring authoritarianism and proves convincingly that decentralization and authoritarianism can work hand in hand.

1. Authoritarianism and decentralization
2. Organizing decentralization
3. Promoting high-level generalists: the management of mayors
4. Organizational power: the view from within
5. Explaining cadre rank
6. The impact of village elections on the appointment of party branch secretaries
7. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], Comparative politics [JPB]