Crafting Law on the Supreme Court
The Collegial Game

Supreme Court decisions stem largely from the political nature of the opinion writing process.

Forrest Maltzman (Author), James F. Spriggs (Author), Paul J. Wahlbeck (Author)

9780521780100, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 17 July 2000

224 pages, 6 b/w illus. 18 tables
23 x 15.8 x 1.9 cm, 0.435 kg

"Crafting Law on the Supreme Court has something to say to, and should be read by, all students of the Court whether one is grounded more in scientific and empirical research on the Court or whether one's interests are more doctrinally oriented. The book's presentation is both rich in detail, mostly provided through the anecdotes the authors share with the reader, but more important, their analysis is systematic, thorough, and ultimately convincing." Journal of Politics

Material is gleaned from internal memos circulated among justices on the Supreme Court to systematically account for the building of majority opinions. The authors argue that at the heart of this process are policy-seeking justices who are constrained by the choices made by the other justices. By strategically using threats, signals, and persuasion, justices attempt to influence the behavior of their colleagues on the bench. Evidence derived from the recently released papers of justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell is used to test the authors' theory of opinion writing. The portrait of the Supreme Court that emerges stands in sharp contrast to the conventional portrait where justices act solely on the basis of the law or their personal policy preferences. This book provides a fascinating glimpse of how the Court crafts the law.

1. Introduction
2. Selecting an author: assigning the majority opinion
3. A strategic response to draft opinions
4. The decision to accommodate
5. The politics of coalition formation
6. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Politics & government [JP]