Cournot Oligopoly
Characterization and Applications

This volume focuses on the properties and uses of Cournot's model of competition among the few.

Andrew F. Daughety (Edited by)

9780521361767, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 27 January 1989

452 pages
23.5 x 15.9 x 2.9 cm, 0.715 kg

"For the professional economist who has not performed oligopoly theory research, it offers a good way to upgrade or renovate knowledge of oligopoly." James R. Marchand, The Southern Economic Journal

Celebrating the 150th anniversary of Cournot's work, which Mark Blaug has characterized as 'a book that for sheer originality and boldness of conception has no equal in the history of economics thought', this volume focuses on the properties and uses of Cournot's model of competition among the few. While there are many issues that Cournot explored in researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth, the topic that he is most readily associated with - and which now is also enjoying a revival - is his model of oligopolistic interaction among firms. This revival of interest in Cournot's model is due largely to increased emphasis by economists on capturing elements of imperfect competition and strategic behavior.

Preface
Part 1. Introduction: 1. Introduction, purpose, and overview Andrew F. Daughety
Part II. Background: 2. Of the competition of producers Augustin Cournot (translation by Nathanial T. Bacon)
3. Review of Walras's Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale and Cournot's Reserches sur les principles mathématiques de la théorie des richesses Joseph Bertrand (translation by James W. Friedman)
4. Non-cooperative games John Nash
Part III. Examining Cournot's Model: 5. On the existence of Cournot equilibrium William Novshek
6. Collusive behavior in non-cooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives Roy Radner
7. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames James W. Friedman
8. Reconsidering Cournot: the Cournot equilibrium is consistent Andrew F. Daughety
9. An experimental test of the consistent-conjectures hypothesis Charles A. Holt
10. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes David M. Kreps and José A. Scheinkman
11. On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation Xavier Vives
12. Price competition vs. quantity competition: the role of uncertainty Paul Klemperer and Margaret Meyer
Part IV. Applications: 13. Cournot and Walras equilibrium William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein
14. Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand Xavier Vives
15. Information transmission - Cournot and Bertrand equilibria Esther Gal-Or
16. Uncertainty resolution, private information aggregation, and the Cournot competitive limit Thomas R. Palfrey
17. Losses from horizontal merger: the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium Stephen W. Salant, Sheldon Switzer, and Robert J. Reynolds
18. Delegation and the theory of the firm John Vickers
19. A study of cartel stability: the Joint Executive Committee, 1880–1886 Robert H. Porter
20. Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect James A. Brander and Tracy R. Lewis.

Subject Areas: Microeconomics [KCC]