Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World
The Political Foundations of Shareholder Power

Presents a new comparative theory to explain the divergence between governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Christopher M. Bruner (Author)

9781107459434, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 30 October 2014

318 pages, 9 b/w illus.
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.7 cm, 0.43 kg

'Christopher Bruner is to be commended for his thorough survey of corporate governance theories and the wealth of historical information about the socio-political circumstances surrounding the formation of each of the four common-law countries' governance regimes. Bruner's explanation and historical analysis of the pivotal position of labor is an original lens through which to examine corporate governance in common-law countries … Without doubt, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World is a highly commendable work and provides an excellent counterpart for further empirical investigation.' Anita Anand and William Muir, Business Ethics Quarterly

The corporate governance systems of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States are often characterized as a single 'Anglo-American' system prioritizing shareholders' interests over those of other corporate stakeholders. Such generalizations, however, obscure substantial differences across the common-law world. Contrary to popular belief, shareholders in the United Kingdom and jurisdictions following its lead are far more powerful and central to the aims of the corporation than are shareholders in the United States. This book presents a new comparative theory to explain this divergence and explores the theory's ramifications for law and public policy. Bruner argues that regulatory structures affecting other stakeholders' interests - notably differing degrees of social welfare protection for employees - have decisively impacted the degree of political opposition to shareholder-centric policies across the common-law world. These dynamics remain powerful forces today, and understanding them will be vital as post-crisis reforms continue to take shape.

Part I. Shareholder Orientation in the Common-Law World: 1. Introduction and overview
2. Comparative theory and corporate governance
3. The corporate governance role of shareholders in common-law jurisdictions
Part II. A Political Theory of Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World: 4. Comparative theories of corporate governance
5. Shareholders, stakeholders, and social welfare policy
Part III. The Theory's Explanatory Domain: 6. Stability, change, and the future of corporate governance in the common-law world.

Subject Areas: Company, commercial & competition law [LNC], Comparative law [LAM], Law [L]