Coordination Games

This 1999 book covers a branch of macroeconomics in which inefficiencies arise from the interaction of agents.

Russell Cooper (Author)

9780521570176, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 28 February 1999

178 pages, 14 b/w illus.
23.8 x 16 x 1.6 cm, 0.425 kg

"The book is an excellent broad survey of the macroeconomic coordination game literature. Indeed, it is amazing how much material it covers in this literature, while maintaining cohesiveness. Cooper has done the profession a great service in writing this book." John Bryant, Journal of Economic Literature

This 1999 book studies the implications of macroeconomic complementarities for aggregate behavior. The presentation is intended to introduce PhD students into this sub-field of macroeconomics and to serve as a reference for more advanced scholars. The initial sections of the book cover the basic framework of complementarities and provide a discussion of the experimental evidence on the outcome of coordination games. The subsequent sections of the book investigate applications of these ideas for macroeconomics. The topics Professor Cooper explores include: economies with production complementarities, search models, imperfectly competitive product markets, models of timing and delay and the role of government in resolving and creating coordination problems. The presentation goes into detail on a few models and uses them as a structure to integrate related literature. The discussion brings together theory and quantitative analysis.

Introduction
1. Experimental evidence and selection
2. A framework for analysis
3. Technological complementarities
4. Imperfect competition and demand spillovers
5. Thick markets: search and matching
6. Timing of discrete choices
7. Government policy
8. Concluding thoughts
References
Endnotes.

Subject Areas: Macroeconomics [KCB]