Contemporary State Building

Explains successful contemporary state-building arrangements that lead to difficult-to-achieve elite taxation to improve public safety in Latin America.

Gustavo A. Flores-Macías (Author)

9781316515129, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 9 June 2022

260 pages
23.5 x 15.7 x 1.9 cm, 0.48 kg

'Right-wing governments are usually disinclined to tax the wealthy, and cozy relations between government and business typically produce states that are more captured than capable. Yet under conditions of extreme security threat, Gustavo Flores-Macías convincingly argues, Latin America has sometimes experienced bouts of state-building through heightened elite taxation under conservative, pro-business rule. A nicely nuanced contribution to our understanding of the complicated political pathways through which internal violence shapes the origins of state power.' Dan Slater, University of Michigan, author of Ordering Power

If economic elites are notorious for circumventing tax obligations, how can institutionally weak governments get the wealthy to shoulder a greater tax burden? This book studies the factors behind the adoption of elite taxes for public safety purposes. Contrary to prominent explanations in the literature on the fiscal strengthening of the state – including the role of resource dependence and inequality – the book advances a theory of elite taxation that focuses on public safety crises as windows of opportunity and highlights the importance of business-government linkages to overcome mistrust toward government from corruption and lack of accountability. Based on evidence from across Latin America and rich case studies from experiences in Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Mexico, the book provides scholars and policymakers with a blueprint for contemporary state-building efforts in the developing world.

I. Introduction: Contemporary state building in Latin America
II. Latin America's elite security taxes
III. A theory of elite taxation and the determinants of security taxes
IV. Colombia's targeted security taxes
V. Costa Rica's “soft” security taxes
VI. El salvador's failed and diffuse taxes
VII. Mexico's uneven security taxes
VIII. Conclusion.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], Politics & government [JP]