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Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind
Brian P. McLaughlin (Edited by), B McLaughlin (Author), Jonathan Cohen (Edited by)
9781119637004, Wiley
Paperback / softback, published 16 February 2023
640 pages
24.1 x 16.8 x 4.1 cm, 0.953 kg
A timely collection of debates concerning the major themes and topics in philosophy of mind, fully updated with new topics covering the latest developments in the field Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind provides a lively and engaging introduction to the conceptual background, ongoing debates, and contentious issues in the field today. Original essays by more than 30 of the discipline’s most influential thinkers offer opposing perspectives on a series of contested questions regarding mental content, physicalism, the place of consciousness in the physical world, and the nature of perception and mental capacities. Written to appeal to non-specialists and professional philosophers alike, the second edition of Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind features five entirely new debates on the relation between perception and cognition, whether pain is a natural kind, whether perception is best understood through representational content or direct contact with the world, whether we need imagination that goes beyond imagery and supposition, and whether perceptual contents are general, particular, or a hybrid. Part of Wiley-Blackwell’s acclaimed Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Second Edition is essential reading for undergraduate and graduate students, academics, professional philosophers, and sophisticated general readers with an interest in the subject.
Notes on Contributors ix Introduction to the Second Edition Jonathan Cohen xiii Introduction to the First Edition Jonathan Cohen xviii Part I Mental Content 1 Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3 1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 5 2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 19 Is Externalism About Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 33 3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 35 4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael McKinsey 50 Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 63 5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 65 6 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 80 Is There Non-conceptual Content? 97 7 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 99 8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard Kimberly Heck 110 Part II Physicalism 131 Is Non-reductive Materialism Viable? 133 9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-reductive Materialism Louise Antony 135 10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 152 Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 173 11 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 175 12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. McLaughlin 189 Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 213 13 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 215 14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 230 Part III The Place Of Consciousness In Nature 251 Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 253 15 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 255 16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 272 Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 285 17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 287 18 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 303 Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 317 19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 319 20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 341 Part IV Perception And Mental Capacities 359 Should Perception Be Understood in Terms of Representation, Direct Contact with the World, or a Hybrid View? 361 21 Naïve Realism, the Slightest Philosophy, and the Slightest Science Craig French and Ian Phillips 363 22 Naïve Realism v. Representationalism: An Argument from Science Adam Pautz 384 23 Capacities-First Philosophy Susanna Schellenberg 406 Is Perception General, Particular, or a Hybrid? 431 24 Perceiving Particulars Christopher S. Hill 433 25 Abstract and Particular Perceptual Content: The Best of Both Theories Heather Logue 449 How Should We Understand the Distinction Between Perception and Cognition? 467 26 The Perception–Cognition Border: Architecture or Format? E. J. Green 469 27 Let’s Get Rid of the Concept of an Object File Ned Block 494 Is Pain a Natural Kind? 517 28 Scientific Eliminativism for Pain Jennifer Corns 519 29 Pain Is a Natural Kind Matthew Fulkerson 535 Do We Need Imagination Over and Above Imagery and Supposition? 551 30 Against Imagination Bence Nanay 553 31 Why We Need Imagination Amy Kind 570 Index 588
Subject Areas: Philosophy [HP]
