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Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science
Robert J. Stainton (Edited by)
9781405113052, Wiley
Paperback / softback, published 30 March 2006
368 pages
24.6 x 17.3 x 2.8 cm, 0.64 kg
"Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science is an excellent introduction to debates in the philosophy of cognitive science. Many of this volume's 18 previously unpublished papers also provide overviews of recent work by the authors, so this would also be a good choice for those who would like to keep up with the latest thinking of many leaders in the field." Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews "This is a remarkable volume. It’s an excellent text for upper division courses, and it also makes important original contributions to research on a number of “hot” topics in cognitive science." Stephen Stich, Rutgers University" "This is an impressive collection of papers by a very strong group of philosophers. Students of philosophy and cognitive science will find that this book afffords a valuable introduction to a range of problems that are both basic and important. Experts will find that the papers make new and significant contributions to living debates. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the nature of mind and in the prospects for scientific understanding of its nature." Alva Noë, University of Caifornia, Berkeley
This volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions.
Acknowledgments vii Notes on Contributors viii Preface xiii Just How Modular Is the Mind? 1 1 The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind 3 2 Is the Mind Really Modular? 22 3 Is the Human Mind Massively Modular? 37 How Much Knowledge of Language Is Innate? 57 4 Irrational Nativist Exuberance 59 5 The Case for Linguistic Nativism 81 6 On the Innateness of Language 97 Has Cognitive Science Shown That Human Beings Are Cognitively Bounded, Or Irrational? 113 7 Bounded and Rational 115 8 Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue 134 Are Rules and Representations Necessary To Explain Systematicity? 145 9 Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules 147 10 Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist, and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective 159 Can Consciousness and Qualia Be Reduced? 187 11 Consciousness and Qualia Can Be Reduced 189 12 Consciousness and Qualia Cannot Be Reduced 202 Does Cognitive Science Need External Content at All? 217 13 Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) 219 14 The Intentional Inexistence of Language – But Not Cars 237 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 257 15 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? 259 16 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations? A Case for the “No” Side 275 Can Mental States, Knowledge in Particular, Be Divided Into a Narrow Component and a Broad Component? 289 17 Can Cognition be Factorized into Internal and External Components? 291 18 The Internal and External Components of Cognition 307 Index 326
Peter Carruthers
Jesse J. Prinz
Richard Samuels
Barbara C. Scholz and Geoffrey K. Pullum
Robert J. Matthews
James McGilvray
Gerd Gigerenzer
David Matheson
Terence Horgan and John Tienson
Adele Abrahamsen and William Bechtel
William G. Lycan
Brie Gertler
Ray Jackendoff
Georges Rey
Kirk Ludwig
Christopher Viger
Timothy Williamson
Ralph Wedgwood
Subject Areas: Philosophy [HP]
