Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis

Financial crises put pressure on constitutional orders, inviting exceptional responses that vary in effectiveness, and have an impact long afterwards.

Tom Ginsburg (Edited by), Mark D. Rosen (Edited by), Georg Vanberg (Edited by)

9781108492294, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 20 June 2019

340 pages
23.5 x 15.6 x 2.2 cm, 0.62 kg

'… this work is an excellent academic account for researchers … this volume is well described as a showcase for an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.' Elizabeth Robson Taylor, Phillip Taylor, The Barrister

Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.

1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg, Mark Rosen and Georg Vanberg
Part I. The Role of Constitutions in Dealing with Crises: 2. Financial emergencies John Ferejohn
3. Rule-of-law objections to the lender of last resort Eric A. Posner
4. Balanced budget provisions in constitutions Tom Ginsburg
5. Legislatures and constitutions in times of severe financial crisis Mark D. Rosen
Part II. Courts and Crises: 6. The place of economic crisis in American constitutional law: the Great Depression as a case study Barry Cushman
7. Financial crises and constitutional compromise Georg Vanberg and Mitu Gulati
8. Commitment for cowards: why the judicialization of austerity is bad policy and even worse politics Daniel Kelemen
9. Protecting fundamental rights during financial crisis: supranational adjudication in the Council of Europe Eva Brems
Part III. Supranational Governance and Crisis: 10. Constitutionalism as limitation and license: crisis governance in the European Union Turkuler Isiksel
11. The institutional origin of Europe's constitutional crises: Grexit, Brexit and the EU form of government Federico Fabbrini
Part IV. Implementing Austerity: 12. The constitutional performance of austerity in Portugal Teresa Violante and Patrícia André
13. Constitutional resilience and constitutional failure in the face of crisis: the Greek case Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou
Part V. The Effect of Crises on Constitutions: 14. Economic crises, political fragmentation, and constitutional choice: the agenda-setting power of presidents in Latin America Gabriel L. Negretto
15. Constitutions, crisis, and regime change: perspectives on East and Southeast Asia Björn Dressel.

Subject Areas: Financial law [LNP], Constitutional & administrative law [LND], International economic & trade law [LBBM], Public international law [LBB], Economic & financial crises & disasters [KCX], Economic systems & structures [KCS], International finance [KCLF], International economics [KCL], Constitution: government & the state [JPHC], Comparative politics [JPB]