Consciousness

This book identifies all of the main forms of consciousness and proposes an account of each of them.

Christopher S. Hill (Author)

9780521125215, Cambridge University Press

Paperback, published 22 October 2009

276 pages, 3 b/w illus.
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.5 cm, 0.39 kg

'Christopher Hill's Consciousness is a valuable contribution to the philosophical literature on consciousness. There are many admirable features of this book. On the whole, I definitely recommend [it] to anybody seriously interested in what a unified Representationalist account of awareness which is sensitive to empirical findings in vision science and neuroscience may look like. This is a very rare opportunity, so it cannot be ignored by anybody worried about a promising strategy for naturalizing the mind.' Erhan Demircioglu, Erkenntnis

This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to undercut dualistic accounts of qualitative states. Other topics include visual awareness, visual appearances, emotional qualia, and meta-cognitive processing. This important work will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

1. Form of consciousness
2. Theories of qualia
3. Awareness, representation, and experience
4. The refutation of dualism
5. Visual awareness and visual qualia
6. Ouch! The paradox of pain
7. Internal weather: the metaphysics of emotional qualia
8. Introspection and consciousness
9. A summary, two supplements, and a look beyond.

Subject Areas: Cognitivism, cognitive theory [JMAQ], Philosophy of mind [HPM]