Comparative Constitutional Design

Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.

Tom Ginsburg (Edited by)

9781107020566, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 27 February 2012

406 pages, 19 b/w illus. 6 tables
22.9 x 15.2 x 2.4 cm, 0.71 kg

'The combination of theoretical and empirical essays will further develop comparative constitutional design as an important perspective and project within comparative constitutional studies.' International Journal of Constitutional Law

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.

1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg
Part I. Design Processes: 2. Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making Jon Elster
3. What we know - and don't know - about design processes Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg
Part II. How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions: 4. Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions: the role of power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw and Barry R. Weingast
5. The origins of parliamentary responsibility Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian and Anjali Thomas Bohlken
6. The social foundations of China's living constitution Randall Peerenboom
7. The political economy of constitutionalism in a post-secular world Ran Hirschl
Part III. Issues in Institutional Design: 8. Designing constitutional amendment rules, to scale Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden
9. Federalism: general welfare, interstate commerce, and economic analysis Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel
10. Personal laws and equality: the case of India Martha Nussbaum
11. Constitutional adjudication, Italian style John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino
12. Tyrannophobia Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele
13. Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and James Melton.

Subject Areas: Constitutional & administrative law [LND], Law [L], Comparative politics [JPB]