Changing the Rules
Constitutional Amendments in Democracies

Demonstrates that constitutional rigidity is a necessary condition for the absence of frequent and significant constitutional amendments and judicial independence.

George Tsebelis (Author)

9781009597265, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 8 May 2025

319 pages
22.9 x 15.2 x 1.9 cm, 0.63 kg

'Ten of the most highly anticipated books of 2025' Richard Albert, The Leaflet

Changing the Rules enters into the debate between theoretical analyses of constitutional amendments (considered the most important part of a constitution) and empirical research (which argues that amendment provisions have little or no significance). George Tsebelis demonstrates how strict provisions are a necessary condition for amendments to have low frequency and significance and provides empirical evidence from case studies and over 100 democracies to corroborate this claim. Examining various cultural theories that dispute these findings, Tsebelis explains why their conclusions have weak foundations. He argues that constitutional rigidity is also a necessary condition for judicial independence and provides theoretical argument and empirical evidence. Tsebelis also establishes a negative correlation between the length of a constitution and problematic indicators such as time inconsistency, low GDP/capita, high corruption, inequality, and lack of innovation. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Foreword
Introduction
1. The landscape of constitutional amendments
2. An institutional approach to constitutional rigidity
3. Cultural theories of constitutional amendments
4. Cases of failed amendments: Italy and Chile
5. A case of successful amendments: Mexico
6. Constitutional rigidity and amendment rate
7. Time inconsistency and other correlates of constitutional length
8. Constitutional rigidity and judicial independence
Conclusions
Bibliography
Appendices.

Subject Areas: Comparative politics [JPB]