Bureaucracies at War
The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation

Rethinks how bureaucracy shapes foreign policy - miscalculation is less likely when political leaders can extract quality information from the bureaucracy.

Tyler Jost (Author)

9781009307222, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 27 June 2024

408 pages
22.8 x 15 x 2.1 cm, 0.59 kg

'Jost examines how the institutional structure of governmental decision-making affects the probability of miscalculation in foreign policy … Overall, the text is both interesting and important. … The case studies are particularly good at showing how changes in leader security lead to changes in institutions and, thus, the success or failure of a foreign policy choice … Highly recommended.' K. Buterbaugh, Choice

Why do states start conflicts they ultimately lose? Why do leaders possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? Bureaucracies at War examines how national security institutions shape the quality of bureaucratic information upon which leaders base their choice for conflict – which institutional designs provide the best counsel, why those institutions perform better, and why many leaders fail to adopt them. Jost argues that the same institutions that provide the best information also empower the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the road to war is often the tragic consequence of how leaders resolve the trade-off between good information and political security. Employing an original cross-national data set and detailed explorations of the origins and consequences of institutions inside China, India, Pakistan, and the United States, this book explores why bureaucracy helps to avoid disaster, how bureaucratic competition produces better information, and why institutional design is fundamentally political.

1. Introduction
2. An institutional theory of miscalculation
3. The world of national security institutions
4. China under Mao
5. China after Mao
6. India
7. Pakistan
8. The United States during the Early Cold War
9. Conclusion
Appendix A: National security institutions data set
Appendix B: Archival and interview data collection.

Subject Areas: International relations [JPS]