Brute Rationality
Normativity and Human Action

This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action.

Joshua Gert (Author)

9780521833189, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 19 August 2004

246 pages
22.4 x 14.6 x 2 cm, 0.46 kg

"Brute Rationality is a remarkable book. It is elegant and engaging, and it aims to deliver s traightfoward solutions to problems not addressed by other theories of practical rationality. The theory of normative reasons developed in Brute Rationality is both detailed and novel." - Sergio Tenenbaum, University of Toronto

This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.

Preface and acknowledgements
1. What would an adequate theory of rationality be like?
2. Practical rationality, morality and purely justificatory reasons
3. The criticism from internalism about practical reasons
4. A functional role analysis of reasons
5. Accounting for our actual normative judgements
6. Fitting the view into the contemporary debate
7. Two concepts of rationality
8. Internalism and different kinds of reasons
9. Brute rationality
References
Index.

Subject Areas: Ethics & moral philosophy [HPQ], Analytical philosophy & Logical Positivism [HPCF5]