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Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy

Provides an innovative theory of regime transitions and outcomes, and tests it using extensive evidence between 1800 and today.

Michael Albertus (Author), Victor Menaldo (Author)

9781107199828, Cambridge University Press

Hardback, published 1 February 2018

322 pages, 14 b/w illus. 16 tables
23.6 x 15.7 x 2.3 cm, 0.57 kg

'… an excellent contribution not only to a more nuanced understanding of democracy, authoritarianism, and the processes of democratization and liberalization, but, also in a more indirect and subtle way, the fruition of a robust and realistic line of approach exploring the logic of public choice phenomena and collective decision making in both democratic and non-democratic settings.' Paul Dragos Aligica, Public Choice

This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.

1. Elites and the causes and consequences of democracy
2. Constitutions as elite deal-making: content and trends
3. Evidence on the causes and consequences of democracy
4. Unravelling the deal: constitutional annulments and amendments under elite biased democracy
5. Sweden: from Agrarian oligarchy to progressive democracy
6. Chile: from authoritarian legacies to a new dawn? 7. Colonial and occupier legacies in new democracies.

Subject Areas: Political economy [KCP], Central government [JPQ], Comparative politics [JPB], Political science & theory [JPA]

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