Assertion and Conditionals

This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief.

Anthony Appiah (Author)

9780521071291, Cambridge University Press

Paperback / softback, published 28 August 2008

280 pages
22.5 x 15.2 x 1.6 cm, 0.36 kg

This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses.

1. Cartesianism, behaviourism and the philosophical context
Part I. Belief: 2. A theory of the mind
3. Belief and decision
4. Computation
5. Truth conditions
Part II. Meaning: 6. Realism and truth-theory
7. Assertion
Part III. Conditionals: 8. Indicative conditionals
9. Truth and triviality
10. Logic without truth
11. Generalising the probabilistic semantics of conditionals.

Subject Areas: Philosophy: logic [HPL]