{"product_id":"this-is-philosophy-of-mind-an-introduction-hardback-9780470674475","title":"This is Philosophy of Mind; An Introduction (Hardback) 9780470674475","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eThis is Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cfont size=\"5\"\u003eAn Introduction\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cp\u003e“This is the most encompassing and up-to-date introduction to the philosophy of mind available today. Mandik has a gift for making technical debates accessible, and his engaging tour travels from the classic to the cutting edge.”\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e—Jesse Prinz, The Graduate Center, CUNY\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e“Is it possible to write a clear, even-handed, comprehensive, concise, and \u003ci\u003eengaging\u003c\/i\u003e guide to contemporary philosophy of mind—in less than 250 pages? I would not have thought so either. THANK YOU, Pete Mandik.”\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e—Kathleen Akins, Simon Fraser University\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003ePete Mandik (Author)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9780470674475, Wiley\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eHardback, published 26 July 2013\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e272 pages\u003cbr\u003e23.8 x 15.9 x 1.9 cm, 0.463 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eThis is Philosophy of Mind\u003c\/i\u003e presents students of philosophy with an accessible introduction to the core issues related to the philosophy of mind.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003eIncludes issues related to the mind-body problem, artificial intelligence, free will, the nature of consciousness, and more\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWritten to be accessible to philosophy students early in their studies\u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eFeatures supplemental online resources on \u003ca href=\"https:\/\/www.wiley.com\/en-us\/thisisphilosophy\/thisisphilosophyofmindanintroduction\"\u003ehttps:\/\/www.wiley.com\/en-us\/thisisphilosophy\/thisisphilosophyofmindanintroduction\u003c\/a\u003e and a frequently updated companion blog, at http:\/\/tipom.blogspot.com\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHow to Use This Book xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgments xvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Meet Your Mind 1\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAspects of Mind 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThought and experience 1\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConscious and unconscious 2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualia 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSensory perception 3\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmotion 4\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImagery 4\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWill and action 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSelf 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePropositional attitudes 5\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhilosophical Problems 6\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMind–body problem 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther problems 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Substance Dualism 15\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Substance Dualism 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLeibniz’s law arguments 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCriticism of Leibniz’s law arguments: Intensional fallacy 19\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExplanatory gap arguments 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCriticisms of explanatory gap arguments 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eModal arguments 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCriticism of the modal arguments: Does conceivability eally entail possibility? 23\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMind–Body Interaction as a Problem for Substance Dualism 24\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrincess Elisabeth’s objection 25\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe dualistic alternatives to Cartesian interactionism 26\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 27\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 Property Dualism 29\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Property Dualism: Qualia and the Brain 29\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Inverted Spectrum 30\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAttack of the Zombies 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Knowledge Argument 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Explanatory Gap Argument 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDoes Property Dualism Lead to Epiphenomenalism? 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Do You Know You’re Not a Zombie? 41\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 42\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Idealism, Solipsism, and Panpsychism 45\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSolipsism: Is It Just Me? 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIdealism: It’s All in the Mind 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s argument from pain 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s argument from perceptual relativity: Berkeley’s bucket 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s “Nothing but an idea can resemble an idea” 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBerkeley’s master argument 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Berkeley is not a solipsist 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguing against idealism 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePanpsychism: Mind Is Everywhere 54\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe analogy argument 55\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe nothing from nothing argument 56\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe evolutionary argument 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguing against panpsychism: The combination problem 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 59\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Behaviorism and Other Minds 61\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBehaviorism: Introduction and Overview 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe History of Behaviorism 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLudwig Wittgenstein and the private language argument 64\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGilbert Ryle versus the ghost in the machine 66\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eObjections to Behaviorism 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe qualia objection 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSellars’s objection 68\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Geach–Chisholm objection 69\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Philosophical Problem of Other Minds 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe rise and fall of the argument from analogy 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDenying the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds 72\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 Mind as Brain 77\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Mind–Brain Identity Theory 77\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvantages of Mind–Brain Identity Theory 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Very Brief Overview of Neuroscience 79\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMajor parts and functions of the nervous system 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMajor parts and functions of the brain 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeurons, neural activations, and brain states 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLesions, imaging, and electrophysiology 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLocalism and holism 81\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLearning and synaptic plasticity 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComputational neuroscience and connectionism 82\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeural correlates of consciousness 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOn pain and c-fi bers 83\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSome General Remarks about Identity 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Mind–Brain Identity Theory 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe zombie argument 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe multiple realizability argument 87\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMax Black’s “distinct property” argument 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Thinking Machines 93\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCan a Machine Think? 93\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlan Turing, Turing Machines, and the Turing Test 94\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlan Turing 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTuring machines 95\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Turing test 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSearle’s Chinese Room Argument 97\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponses to the Chinese Room Argument 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Silicon Chip Replacement Thought Experiment 99\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSymbolicism versus Connectionism 102\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Functionalism 109\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Gist of Functionalism 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Brief History of Functionalism 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Functionalism 112\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe causal argument 112\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe multiple realization argument 114\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Varieties of Functionalism 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTuring machine functionalism 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnalytic functionalism versus empirical functionalism 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Functionalism 119\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdapting the zombie argument to be against functionalism 120\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdapting the Chinese room argument to be against functionalism 121\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Mental Causation 123\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Mental Causation 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe causal closure of the physical 124\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem for substance dualists 126\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe problem for property dualists 126\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Views of Interaction 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInteractionism 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eParallelism 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEpiphenomenalism 129\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReductionism 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualia and Epiphenomenalism 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhether qualia-based epiphenomenalism conflicts with phenomenal self-knowledge 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDennett’s zimboes 131\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnomalous Monism 132\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Explanatory Exclusion Argument 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 Eliminative Materialism 139\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction and Overview 139\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBasic Ingredients of Contemporary Eliminative Materialism 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology as a theory 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe contrast between reduction and elimination 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePutting the ingredients together 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments for Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism 143\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology is a stagnant research program 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology is committed to propositional attitudes having a sentential structure that is unsupported by neuroscientific research 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology makes commitments to features of mental states that lead to an unacceptable epiphenomenalism 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguments against Propositional Attitude Eliminative Materialism 145\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEliminative materialism is self-refuting 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “theory” theory is false 146\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFolk psychology is indispensable 147\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntrospection reveals the existence of propositional attitudes 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQualia Eliminative Materialism: “Quining” Qualia 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Perception, Mental Imagery, and Emotion 155\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerception 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDirect realism and the argument from illusion 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhilosophical theories of perception 158\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMental Imagery 161\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow similar are mental images to other mental states? 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs mental imagery the basis for mental states such as thoughts? 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo what degree, if any, is mental imagery genuinely imagistic or picture-like? 163\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmotion 165\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat distinguishes emotions from other mental states? 166\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat distinguishes different emotions from each other? 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe difficulties in giving a unifi ed account of the emotions 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12 The Will: Willpower and Freedom 171\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Free Will and Determinism 171\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSources of Determinism 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral remarks 173\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhysical determinism 174\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheological determinism 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLogical determinism 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEthical determinism 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePsychological determinism 176\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCompatibilism 177\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncompatibilism 178\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe origination or causal chain argument 179\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe consequence argument 180\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat Might Free Will Be, If There Were Any Such Thing? 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFreedom aside for the moment, what is the will? 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat might the freedom of the will consist in? 183\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13 Intentionality and Mental Representation 187\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroducing Intentionality 187\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Inconsistent Triad of Intentionality 188\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefending each individual proposition 189\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpelling out the inconsistency 190\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternalism versus Externalism 190\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor externalism: The Twin Earth thought experiment 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgainst externalism: Swampman and the brain in the vat 193\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheories of Content Determination 194\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResemblance theory 194\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterpretational semantics 195\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConceptual role semantics 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCausal or informational theory 198\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTeleological evolutionary theory 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 200\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 200\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14 Consciousness and Qualia 203\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOptimism about Explaining Consciousness 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFocusing on Several Different Uses of the Word “Conscious” 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCreature consciousness 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTransitive consciousness 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eState consciousness 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhenomenal consciousness 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRosenthal’s Higher Order Thought Theory of Consciousness 206\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn objection to the HOT theory: Introspectively implausible 209\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnother objection to the HOT theory: Too intellectual 209\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFirst Order Representation Theories of Consciousness 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe transparency argument for first order representationalism 213\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe “Spot” argument for fi rst order representationalism 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e15 Is This the End? Personal Identity, the Self, and Life after Death 217\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems of Personal Identity 217\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Problem of Persistence 219\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eApproaches to the Problem of Persistence 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe psychological approach 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe fission problem for the psychological approach 221\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe somatic or bodily approach 222\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTemporal parts theory aka perdurantism aka four-dimensionalism 224\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe no-self view 225\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLife after Death 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubstance dualism and the afterlife 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMind–brain identity theory and the afterlife 228\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFunctionalism and the afterlife 229\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTemporal parts and the afterlife 229\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNo-self and the afterlife 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConclusion 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnotated Bibliography 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 233\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Philosophy [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Philosophy\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Philosophy%20%5BHP%5D%22\"\u003eHP\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Brand New","offer_id":52276385382680,"sku":null,"price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/files\/9780470674475.jpg?v=1781369301","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/this-is-philosophy-of-mind-an-introduction-hardback-9780470674475","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}