{"product_id":"the-economics-of-information-lying-and-cheating-in-markets-and-organizations-paperback-softback-9780631206668","title":"The Economics of Information; Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations (Paperback \/ softback) 9780631206668","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eThe Economics of Information\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cfont size=\"5\"\u003eLying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003eIan Molho (Author)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9780631206668, Wiley\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003ePaperback \/ softback, published 19 September 1997\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e276 pages\u003cbr\u003e23.1 x 15.2 x 2 cm, 0.435 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eKnowledge is a vital resource which confers strategic advantages on those that possess it, and provides the possibility of misuse and abuse with increasingly dangerous economic consequences.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eList of Figures. \u003cp\u003eList of Tables.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreface.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons.\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. Adverse Selection: The Wilson Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4. Lemons Problems: Experimental Evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II: Signalling.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5. Job Market Signalling.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6. Screening: A Self-Selection Mechanism.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7. Further Literature on Signalling Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8. Signalling\/Screening Behaviour: Experimental Evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III: Moral Hazard.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9. Moral Hazard: Shareholder\/Management Relations.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10. Moral Hazard: A Principal-Agent Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11. Further Literature on Moral Hazard and Agency Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12. Moral Hazard: Experimental Evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and Auctions.\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13. Mechanism Design and the Revelation Principle: A Bargaining Example.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14. Auction Design: Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15. Auction Design: Experimental Evidence.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16. Concluding Comments.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule, Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Economics [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Economics\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Economics%20%5BKC%5D%22\"\u003eKC\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Brand New","offer_id":52509191733528,"sku":"9780631206668","price":41.99,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/files\/9780631206668.jpg?v=1786496898","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/the-economics-of-information-lying-and-cheating-in-markets-and-organizations-paperback-softback-9780631206668","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}