{"product_id":"markets-and-democracy-participation-accountability-and-efficiency-hardback-9780521432238","title":"Markets and Democracy; Participation, Accountability and Efficiency (Hardback) 9780521432238","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eMarkets and Democracy\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cfont size=\"5\"\u003eParticipation, Accountability and Efficiency\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThis book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable.\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003eSamuel Bowles (Edited by), Herbert Gintis (Edited by), Bo Gustafsson (Edited by)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9780521432238, Cambridge University Press\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eHardback, published 22 July 1993\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e360 pages, 5 tables\u003cbr\u003e23.6 x 15.7 x 3.2 cm, 0.7 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e\"The book contains much else of interest including a substantial, unified bibliography.  In spite of the game-theoretic approach, I learned a lot from it. Because of the game-theoretic approach, orthodox economists will too.\"   William M. Dugger, Journal of Economic Issues\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eThe market does not spontaneously generate democratic or participatory economic institutions. This book asks whether a modern, efficient economy can be rendered democratically accountable and, if so, what strategic changes might be required to regulate the market-mediated interaction of economic agents. The contributors bring contemporary microeconomic theory to bear on a range of related issues, including the relationship between democratic firms and efficiency in market economies; incentives and the relative merits of various forms of internal democratic decision-making; and the effects of democratically accountable firms on innovation, saving, investment, and on the informational and disciplinary aspects of markets. Various approaches to the study of economic interaction (game theory, transactions' cost analysis, social choice theory, rent-seeking, etc.) are considered in an attempt to understand the relationship between power and efficiency in market economies.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eList of figures\u003cbr\u003e List of tables\u003cbr\u003e Preface Bo Gustafsson\u003cbr\u003e 1. Post-Walrasian political economy Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis\u003cbr\u003e Part I. Agency, Incentives, and Democratic Accountability: 2. The democratic firm: an agency-theoretic evaluation Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis\u003cbr\u003e 3. Alternative employment and payment systems D. M. Nuti\u003cbr\u003e Part II. Institutions and Institutional Change: 4. Toward a framework for analyzing institutions and institutional change Leonid Hurwicz\u003cbr\u003e 5. Imperfect choice and rule-governed behaviour Ronald A. Heiner\u003cbr\u003e 6. Organizational equilibria and institutional stability Ugo Pagano\u003cbr\u003e 7. Agency problems and the future of comparative systems' theory Mieke Meurs\u003cbr\u003e Part III. Conditions For the Success of the Democratic Firm: 8. After the employment relation: problems on the road to enterprise democracy Louis Putterman\u003cbr\u003e 9. Unions versus cooperatives Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein\u003cbr\u003e 10. Demand variability and work organization David I. Levine\u003cbr\u003e 11. Democracy versus appropriability: can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world? Gregory K. Dow\u003cbr\u003e Part IV. Productivity, Distribution, and Power: 12. Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations Avner Ben-Ner\u003cbr\u003e 13. Wage bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms Gilbert L. Skillmand and Harl E. Ryder\u003cbr\u003e Part V. Ownership, Participation, and Capital Markets: 14. The motivational role of an external agent in the informationally-participatory firm Masahiko Aoki\u003cbr\u003e 15. Unstable ownership Tone Ogedal\u003cbr\u003e 16. The simple analytics of a membership market in a labor-managed economy Ernst Fehr\u003cbr\u003e Part VI. Political Democracy and Economic Democracy: 17. Investment planning in market socialism Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre\u003cbr\u003e 18. Capitalism and Democracy: a summing up of the arguments Martin L. Weitzman\u003cbr\u003e Bibliography\u003cbr\u003e Author Index\u003cbr\u003e Subject index.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Political economy [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Political economy\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Political%20economy%20%5BKCP%5D%22\"\u003eKCP\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Cambridge University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46007288070424,"sku":"9780521432238","price":109.19,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/products\/9780521432238i_75d7acef-edfa-459a-a1c2-32ec0d2abd05.jpg?v=1691381760","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/markets-and-democracy-participation-accountability-and-efficiency-hardback-9780521432238","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}