{"product_id":"knowledge-belief-and-strategic-interaction-hardback-9780521416740","title":"Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction (Hardback) 9780521416740","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eKnowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThis volume offers a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning.\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003eCristina Bicchieri (Edited by), Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (Edited by)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9780521416740, Cambridge University Press\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eHardback, published 28 August 1992\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e432 pages\u003cbr\u003e23.6 x 15.9 x 2.5 cm, 0.785 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e\"...a first class collection of essays that should both advance the foundations of modern game theory and give philosophers an excellent and up-to-date view as to what is going on in this recently and increasingly important area of philosophy.\"   Ellery Eells, University of Wisconsin\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eThere has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief, deliberation and learning, and in the relationship between Bayesian decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded rationality and computational complexity.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003ePreface\u003cbr\u003e 1. Feasibility Isaac Levi\u003cbr\u003e 2. Elicitation for games Joseph B. Kadane, Isaac Levi and Teddy Seidenfeld\u003cbr\u003e 3. Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions Joseph B. Kadane and Teddy Seidenfeld\u003cbr\u003e 4. Rational choice in the context of ideal games Edward F. McClennen\u003cbr\u003e 5. Hyperrational games: concept and resolutions Jordan Howard Sobel\u003cbr\u003e 6. Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation Brian Skyrms\u003cbr\u003e 7. Tortuous labyrinth: noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz\u003cbr\u003e 8. On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation Stefano Vannucci\u003cbr\u003e 9. Algorithmic knowledge and game theory Ken Binmore and Hyun Song Shin\u003cbr\u003e 10. Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara\u003cbr\u003e 11. Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic Giovanna Corsi and Silvio Ghilardi\u003cbr\u003e 12. Epistemic logic and game theory Bernard Walliser\u003cbr\u003e 13. Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses Vittorioemanuele Ferrante\u003cbr\u003e 14. Representing facts Krister Segerberg\u003cbr\u003e 15. Introduction to metamoral Roberto Magari\u003cbr\u003e 16. The logic of Ulam's games with lies Daniele Mundici\u003cbr\u003e 17. The acquisition of common knowledge Michael Bacharach\u003cbr\u003e 18. The electronic mail game: strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge' Ariel Rubinstein\u003cbr\u003e 19. Knowledge-depentent games: backward induction Cristina Bicchieri\u003cbr\u003e 20. Common knowledge and games with perfect information Philip J. Reny\u003cbr\u003e 21. Game solutions and the normal form John C. Harsanyi\u003cbr\u003e 22. The dynamics of belief systems: foundations versus coherence theories Peter Gärdenfors\u003cbr\u003e 23. Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games Hyun Song Shin.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Philosophy: logic [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Philosophy: logic\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Philosophy:%20logic%20%5BHPL%5D%22\"\u003eHPL\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Cambridge University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46007258841368,"sku":"9780521416740","price":90.79,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/products\/9780521416740i_9378eb24-ffc6-467e-ae99-19a48a01e910.jpg?v=1691381382","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/knowledge-belief-and-strategic-interaction-hardback-9780521416740","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}