{"product_id":"knowledge-and-the-gettier-problem-hardback-9781107149564","title":"Knowledge and the Gettier Problem (Hardback) 9781107149564","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eKnowledge and the Gettier Problem\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThis book enriches our understanding of knowledge and Gettier's challenge, stimulating debate on a central epistemological issue.\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003eStephen Hetherington (Author)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9781107149564, Cambridge University Press\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eHardback, published 1 September 2016\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e254 pages\u003cbr\u003e23.6 x 16 x 2 cm, 0.52 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eEdmund Gettier's 1963 verdict about what knowledge is not has become an item of philosophical orthodoxy, accepted by philosophers as a genuine epistemological result. It assures us that - contrary to what Plato and later philosophers have thought - knowledge is not merely a true belief well supported by epistemic justification. But that orthodoxy has generated the Gettier problem - epistemology's continuing struggle to understand how to accommodate Gettier's apparent result within an improved conception of knowledge. In this book, Stephen Hetherington argues that none of epistemology's standard attempts to solve that problem have succeeded: he shows how subtle yet fundamental mistakes - regarding explication, methodology, properties, modality, and fallibility - have permeated those responses to Gettier's challenge. His fresh and original book outlines a new way of solving the problem, and an improved grasp of Gettier's challenge and its significance is the result. In a sense, Plato can now embrace Gettier.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003ePart I. Introducing Gettierism: 1.1. The year of Gettier\u003cbr\u003e 1.2. Gettierism introduced\u003cbr\u003e 1.3. Gettier cases introduced\u003cbr\u003e 1.4. Gettierism refined\u003cbr\u003e 1.5. Gettierism finalised: individual-Gettierism versus property-Gettierism\u003cbr\u003e 1.6. Gettieristic responses to Gettier cases\u003cbr\u003e 1.7. Supporting Gettierism\u003cbr\u003e Part II. Explicating Gettierism: A General Challenge: 2.1. Introduction\u003cbr\u003e 2.2. The fallibilism underlying Gettierism\u003cbr\u003e 2.3. A general anti-Gettierism argument\u003cbr\u003e 2.3.1. The strategy\u003cbr\u003e 2.3.2. The argument\u003cbr\u003e 2.3.3. Objection: merely definitional?\u003cbr\u003e Part III. Explicating Gettierism: A Case Study: 3.1. Introduction\u003cbr\u003e 3.2 Veritic luck\u003cbr\u003e 3.3. The argument\u003cbr\u003e 3.4. The argument, more metaphysically\u003cbr\u003e 3.5. An alternative Gettieristic interpretation of safety?\u003cbr\u003e 3.6. Belief-forming methods\u003cbr\u003e 3.7. The backward clock\u003cbr\u003e 3.8. The anti-luck intuition supplanted\u003cbr\u003e Part IV. Explicating Gettierism: Modality and Properties: 4.1. Introduction\u003cbr\u003e 4.2. Objection: modal fallacy?\u003cbr\u003e 4.2.1. The objection\u003cbr\u003e 4.2.2. The property of being Gettiered\u003cbr\u003e 4.2.3. Property preclusion\u003cbr\u003e 4.2.4. Predicates for the property of being Gettiered\u003cbr\u003e 4.2.5. Property analysis\u003cbr\u003e 4.3. Objection: another modal fallacy?\u003cbr\u003e 4.3.1. The objection\u003cbr\u003e 4.3.2. The objection's failure\u003cbr\u003e 4.3.3. Individual-Gettierism versus property-Gettierism, again\u003cbr\u003e Part V. Explicating Gettierism: Infallibility Presuppositions: 5.1. A question\u003cbr\u003e 5.2. Some Gettieristic reasoning\u003cbr\u003e 5.3. Realistic possibilities?\u003cbr\u003e 5.4. A case study: virtue-theoretic manifestation\u003cbr\u003e 5.4.1. Sosa\/Turri's Gettieristic proposal\u003cbr\u003e 5.4.2. Fallibilism within Gettier's challenge\u003cbr\u003e 5.4.3. Turri's unwitting infallibilism\u003cbr\u003e 5.4.4. A methodological moral\u003cbr\u003e 5.4.5. Manifestation clarified\u003cbr\u003e 5.5. Conclusion\u003cbr\u003e Part VI. Gettierism and its Intuitions: 6.1. Intuitive support?\u003cbr\u003e 6.2. Gettier's fallibilism, again\u003cbr\u003e 6.3. A methodological moral, again\u003cbr\u003e 6.4. A methodological question about Gettieristic assessments\u003cbr\u003e 6.5. A methodological problem for Gettieristic assessments\u003cbr\u003e 6.6. An objection and two replies\u003cbr\u003e 6.7. Conclusion\u003cbr\u003e Part VII. Gettierism Improved: 7.1. A compatibilist aim\u003cbr\u003e 7.2. An old-fashioned account of not being Gettiered\u003cbr\u003e 7.2.1. An internalist condition\u003cbr\u003e 7.2.2. A fallibilist condition\u003cbr\u003e 7.2.3. A non-reductive condition\u003cbr\u003e 7.3. A non-reductive justified-true-belief conception of knowledge.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Philosophy: epistemology \u0026amp; theory of knowledge [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Philosophy: epistemology \u0026amp; theory of knowledge\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Philosophy:%20epistemology%20\u0026amp;%20theory%20of%20knowledge%20%5BHPK%5D%22\"\u003eHPK\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Cambridge University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46265642385688,"sku":"9781107149564","price":82.49,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/products\/9781107149564i.jpg?v=1692025210","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/knowledge-and-the-gettier-problem-hardback-9781107149564","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}