{"product_id":"games-and-information-an-introduction-to-game-theory-hardback-9781405136662","title":"Games and Information; An Introduction to Game Theory (Hardback) 9781405136662","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eGames and Information\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cfont size=\"5\"\u003eAn Introduction to Game Theory\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003eEric Rasmusen (Author)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9781405136662, Wiley\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eHardback, published 11 October 2006\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e560 pages\u003cbr\u003e25.4 x 19.6 x 3.8 cm, 1.155 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003ePraise for the 3rd edition\u003cbr\u003e \u003cp\u003e\"Rasmusen’s Games and Information provides wonderful coverage of the basics of game theory and information economics. His consistent style of presenting the theoretical structures lucidly unifies his test’s wide and well-chosen range of applications. I wish that all my students could take a course based on this book, and envy them the opportunity.\"\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eMaxwell B. Stinchcombe, University of Texas at Austin\u003c\/i\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\"This is a terrific book bringing together two strands in the recent literature on economic theory, namely game theory and the economics of asymmetric information. The style is brisk, the arguments are rigorous and it seems to be pitched at exactly the right level.\"\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePartha Dasgupta, University of Cambridge\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eWritten in a crisp and approachable style, \u003ci\u003eGames and Information\u003c\/i\u003e uses simple modeling techniques and straightforward explanations to provide students with an understanding of game theory and information economics. \u003cbr\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli style=\"list-style: none\"\u003e\n\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eWritten for introductory courses seeking a little rigor.\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eThe 4th edition brings the material fully up-to-date and includes new end-of-chapter problems and classroom projects, as well as a math appendix.\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/li\u003e \u003cli\u003eAccompanied by a comprehensive website featuring solutions to problems and teaching notes.\u003c\/li\u003e \u003c\/ul\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eList of Figures. \u003cp\u003eList of Tables.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Games.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreface.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContents and Purpose.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChanges in the Second Edition (1994).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChanges in the Third Edition (2001).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChanges in the Fourth Edition (2006).\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUsing the Book.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Level of Mathematics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther Books.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContact Information.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHistory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGame Theory’s Method.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExemplifying Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis Book’s Style.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART 1: GAME THEORY.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1. The Rules of the Game.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefinitions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner’s Dilemma.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, The Battle of the Sexes and Ranked Coordination.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFocal Points.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2. Information.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInformation Sets.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExample: The Png Settlement Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3. Mixed and Continuous Strategies.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMixed Strategies: The Welfare Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The Civic Duty Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRandomizing is not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContinuous Strategies: The Cournot Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eContinuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and Strategic.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubstitutes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExistence of Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4. Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubgame Perfectness.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCredible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open-Set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRecoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto Perfection.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5. Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInfinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReputation: The One-sided Prisoner’s Dilemma.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProduct Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarkov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6. Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRefining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and PhD Admissions Games.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: The Gang of Four Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Axelrod Tournament.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCredit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART 2: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7. Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCategories of Asymmetric Information Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Principal-agent Model: The Production Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOptimal Contracts: The Broadway Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8. Further Topics in Moral Hazard.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEfficiency Wages.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTournaments.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutions and Agency Problems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRenegotiation: The Repossession Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eState-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJoint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Multitask Agency Problem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9. Adverse Selection.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduction: Production Game VI.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHeterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarket Microstructure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Variety of Applications.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10. Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation Principle.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMyerson Mechanism Design.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Groves Mechanism.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrice Discrimination.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11. Signalling.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Informed Player Moves First: Signalling.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariants on the Signalling Model of Education.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral Comments on Signalling in Education.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Informed Player Moves Second: Screening.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSignal Jamming and Limit Pricing.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountersignalling.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePART 3: APPLICATIONS.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12. Bargaining.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Nash Bargaining Solution.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlternating Offers over Finite Time.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlternating Offers over Infinite Time.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncomplete Information.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSetting Up a Way to Bargain: The Myerson–Satterthwaite Mechanism.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13. Auctions.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eValues Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOptimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRevenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCommon-value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAsymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14. Pricing.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eQuantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLocation Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Statics and Supermodular Games.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eVertical Differentiation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDurable Monopoly.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProblems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eClassroom Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMathematical Appendix\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNotation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Greek Alphabet.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlossary.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFormulas and Functions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProbability Distributions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSupermodularity.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFixed Point Theorems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGenericity.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiscounting.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRisk.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences and Name Index.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubject Index\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Economics [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Economics\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Economics%20%5BKC%5D%22\"\u003eKC\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Brand New","offer_id":52173718520088,"sku":"9781405136662","price":34.87,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/files\/9781405136662.jpg?v=1781168124","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/games-and-information-an-introduction-to-game-theory-hardback-9781405136662","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}