{"product_id":"essentials-of-biological-security-a-global-perspective-hardback-9781394189014","title":"Essentials of Biological Security; A Global Perspective (Hardback) 9781394189014","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eEssentials of Biological Security\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cfont size=\"5\"\u003eA Global Perspective\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003eLijun Shang (Edited by), L Shang (Author), Weiwen Zhang (Edited by), Malcolm Dando (Edited by)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9781394189014, Wiley\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eHardback, published 11 April 2024\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e320 pages\u003cbr\u003e25 x 19 x 2.2 cm, 0.765 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eEssentials of Biological Security\u003c\/b\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eA guide to minimizing the threat of misusing benignly intended and dual-use biological research \u003c\/b\u003e \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn \u003ci\u003eEssentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective\u003c\/i\u003e, a team of distinguished researchers delivers a fundamental resource designed to raise awareness and understanding of biological security as it pertains to the malign manipulation of benignly intended scientific research.  \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWritten by experts who have spent decades involved in biological security issues, the book is systematically organized to make it accessible to a wide range of life scientists likely to encounter dangerous opportunities for the deliberate misuse of their research. Readers will also find:  \u003c\/p\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eA thorough introduction to biological security and the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) threat spectrum \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eComprehensive explorations of the history of biological weapons from antiquity to modern day \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003ePractical discussions of dual-use technologies and how to minimize their risk \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eExpert analyses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other relevant international agreements and organizations \u003c\/li\u003e\n\u003c\/ul\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerfect for professionals working in life sciences, medicine, global health, biosafety, and biosecurity, \u003ci\u003eEssentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective \u003c\/i\u003ewill also benefit anyone with an interest in and being responsible for biological security.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEndorsement xv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Figures xvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Tables xviii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eList of Contributors xix\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eForeword xxi\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcknowledgements xxv\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAcronyms xxvii\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1 Biological Security After the Pandemic 1\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eLijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang, and Malcolm Dando\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.1 The Objective of the Book 2\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.2 The Structure of the Book 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.3 Overview of the Chapters 7\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 8\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 9\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e2 Falling Between the Cracks and by the Sides: Can Disarmament Treaties Respond to Scientific and Technological Developments? 11\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eJean Pascal Zanders\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.1 Introduction 12\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2 Concepts of Disease and Toxicants in Relationship to CBW 13\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2.1 The Impact of Germ Theory on the ‘Poison’ Concept 14\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2.2 The Impact of Chemistry on the ‘Poison’ Concept 15\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.3 Capturing Evolving Concepts of Disease and Toxicants in Restraining Warfare 16\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4 Further Development of the Control of Toxic Weapons 17\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4.1 Confirming the Semantic Bifurcation 18\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.4.2 Of Humanitarian Foundations and a Dual-Use Quandary 20\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5 Implications of Evolving Concepts and S\u0026amp;T Developments for Disarmament Law 21\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5.1 Institutional Interests 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5.2 Semantic Shifts as Indicators of Scientific and Technological Advancements 22\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.5.3 The Future Dimension of Disarmament 23\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.6 Conclusions: Responding to S\u0026amp;T Developments 25\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 28\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e3 A Multifaceted Threat 31\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eGemma Bowsher\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.1 Introduction 32\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2 Assessing the Utility and Scope of Biological Weapons at Various Scales 33\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.3 Diverse Objectives of Bioweapon Use: Past and Present 34\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.4 Evolving Biotechnologies 36\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5 Changing Biothreat Landscapes 37\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5.1 Cyber-Dependency 38\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.5.2 Disinformation 38\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.6 Conclusion 39\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 40\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 40\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e4 Biological Weapons from the Ancient World to 1945 43\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eBrett Edwards\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.1 Introduction 44\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.2 Map of the Literature 45\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3 Historical Review 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.1 Pre-history (72,000–500 BCE) 46\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.2 Ancient History (500 BCE–1000 AD) 47\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.3 Medieval and Early Modern (1000–1750 AD) 48\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.4 Late Modern (1750–1915 AD) 49\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.5 World War I (1914–1918 AD) 49\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.6 Inter-War Years (1918–1939 AD) 50\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.3.7 World War II 51\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.4 Conclusions 52\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 53\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e5 Biological Weapons from 1946 to 2000 57\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eBrian Balmer\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.1 Introduction 57\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.2 Overview of State BW Programmes 58\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3 Offensive Aspects of BW Programmes 61\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.3.1 Human Exposure and Experimentation 62\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.4 Non-state Actors 63\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.5 Drivers and Inhibitors of State BW Programmes 65\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.6 Conclusions 66\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 67\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e6 The Problem of Dual Use in the Twenty-first Century 69\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eKathryn Nixdorff\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.1 Relationship of the Advances in Science and Technology to the BTWC 70\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2 Evolution of the Dual-Use Dilemma 71\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2.1 Example 1. The Mousepox Experiment (2001) 73\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2.2 Example 2. Synthesis of the Poliovirus Genome and Recovery of Infectious Virus (2002) 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2.3 Example 3. Reconstruction of the ‘Spanish Flu’ Influenza Virus of 1918 (2005) 74\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.2.4 Example 4. Alteration of the Host Range and Increase in the Transmissibility of the H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus (2012) 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.3 DURC Criteria with Examples in Each Case of Published Research Reports of Work That Has DURC Character 75\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.4 Problems in Dealing with Dual Use: Debates About What Should Be Done 78\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 80\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e7 Key Cutting-Edge Biotechnologies Today 83\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eXinyu Song and Weiwen Zhang\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.1 Introduction 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2 Development and Application of Synthetic Biology 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.1 Landmark Achievement in Synthetic Biology 84\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.2 Opportunities for Medical Application 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.3 Benefits to Agricultural Development 85\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.4 Changing the Future of Foods 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.5 Creation of Sustainable Energy 86\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.2.6 Approaches for New Materials 87\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3 Development and Application of Genome Editing 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3.1 Landmark Progress in Genome Editing 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3.2 Potential in Curing Diseases 88\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.3.3 Supporting Sustainable Agriculture 89\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4 Main Biosafety and Biosecurity Concerns Associated with Key Cutting-Edge Biotechnologies 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4.1 The Increasing Accessibility of Biotechnology Tools and Techniques Exacerbates Safety and Security Risks 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4.2 Emerging\/Re-emerging Infectious Diseases Aggravate the Misuse and Abuse Risk of Cutting-Edge Biotechnologies 90\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.4.3 Integration and Innovation in the Field of Cutting-Edge Technologies Aggravate Safety and Security Risk 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.5 Conclusions 91\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 92\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e8 Convergence of Science and Technology 95\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eRalf Trapp\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.1 Introduction 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.2 Convergence of Science and Technology in the Life Sciences 96\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.3 Convergence and Arms Control and Security 98\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.4 Technologies of Particular Relevance for Possible Misuse of Biology for Nefarious Purposes 100\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8.5 Mitigation of the Evolving Misuse Potential Resulting from Convergence 103\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 105\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 106\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e9 Role of the Life Science Community in Strengthening the Web of Prevention for Biosafety and Biosecurity 107\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eTatyana Novossiolova\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1 Introduction 108\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.2 Integrating Biosafety with Biosecurity: The Web of Prevention as a Model Concept 109\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3 Addressing the Threat of Deliberate Biological Events and Life Science Misuse 110\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3.1 Multi-layered Framework for Response to Deliberate Biological Events 111\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3.2 An Integrated Approach for Biological Risk Management in Life Science Research and Innovation 114\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.3.3 Biosecurity Risk Communication and Public Engagement 115\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.4 Implications for the Governance of Biotechnology in the Twenty-first Century 117\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 118\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e10 The 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BTWC 121\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eJez Littlewood\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.1 Introduction 122\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.2 The Origins and Evolution of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BTWC 123\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.3 The Review Conferences of the BTWC and Their Outcomes: 1980–2022 125\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.4 Biological Disarmament as It Is: Strengths and Weakness of the BTWC and the Geneva Protocol in the Twenty-first Century 127\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.5 The BTWC Beyond 50 and the Geneva Protocol Beyond 100: Can They Prevent Biological Warfare? 128\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10.6 Conclusion 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 130\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e11 Constraining the Weaponisation of Pathogens and Toxic Chemicals Through International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law 133\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eMichael Crowley\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.1 Introduction 134\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2 International Humanitarian Law 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.1 Introduction 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2 Over-arching IHL Obligations Constraining Weaponisation of Toxic Chemicals and Pathogens 135\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.1 The Prohibition of Deliberate Attacks on Civilians, the Prohibition of Indiscriminate Weapons and of Attacks That Do Not Discriminate Between Civilians and Military Objectives 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.2 The Prohibition of the Employment of Means and Methods of Warfare of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering (SIRUS) 136\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.3 The Protection of Persons Considered Hors de Combat 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.4 Requirement to Respect and Ensure Respect of International Humanitarian Law 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.5 Prohibition of Methods or Means of Warfare Intended to Cause Widespread, Long-term and Severe Damage to the Natural Environment; Prohibition on the Deliberate Destruction of the Natural Environment as a Form of Weapon 137\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.2.2.6 Obligations to Review ‘New’ Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3 International Human Rights Law 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.1 Introduction 138\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.2 Protection of the Right to Life and Restrictions on the Use of Force 139\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.2.1 Application to Riot Control Agents (RCAs) 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.2.2 Application to CNS-Acting Chemical Agent Weapons 140\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.3 Prohibition Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.3.1 Application to Psychoactive (CNS)-Acting Chemical Agents 141\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.3.2 Application to Riot Control Agents 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.3.4 Obligations to Review and Monitor the Use of ‘Less Lethal’ Weapons 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11.4 Conclusions 142\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 144\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e12 The Role of International Organisations in Biosecurity and the Prevention of Biological Warfare 147\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eLouison Mazeaud, James Revill, Jaroslav Krasny, and Vivienne Zhang\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.1 Introduction 148\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.2 The Role of IOs in Fostering the Norm Against Biological Weapons 149\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3 IOs in the Genesis of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3.1 Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3.2 The UN Secretary-General’s CBW Report 150\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.3.3 The WHO Report on Health Aspects of CBW 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4 IOs and the Evolution of Biosecurity Governance 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.1 UNSC Resolution 1540 151\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.2 UN Secretary General’s Mechanism (Authoritative and Objective Assessment) 152\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.3 Tending the BWC: The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and the Work of Unoda 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.4 WHO, Biosecurity and the Governance of Dual-Use Research 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.5 Combatting Biological Crimes: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) 153\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.4.6 Unidir 154\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.5 The Strengths of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.6 The Limits of IOs in Biosecurity and Prevention of Biological Warfare 155\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.7 Conclusions 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 156\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 157\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e13 Laboratory Biorisk Management as a Key Tool for Scientists to Understand Future Biological Threats and Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention 161\u003c\/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e \u003ci\u003eMayra Ameneiros\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.1 History, Context and Current International Guidance 162\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.2 Biosafety and Biosecurity Awareness 165\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.3 The Role of Scientists: Tailored Biorisk Management Practices 167\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.4 Case Scenarios: Practical Examples 168\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.5 An Ongoing Cycle to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 170\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e14 Examples of Biorisk Management National Regulatory Frameworks 173\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eDana Perkins and Lela Bakanidze\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.1 Introduction 174\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.2 Laboratory Biosafety and Biosecurity in the US 175\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.3 Import–Export and Transportation of Infectious Substances in the US 179\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.4 Genetic Engineering and Dual-Use Oversight in the US 180\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.5 The Culture of Biosafety, Biosecurity and Responsible Conduct in the US 181\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.6 The Biorisk Management National Regulatory Framework of Georgia 182\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.7 Conclusion 185\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 186\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e15 Lessons from ePPP Research and the COVID-19 Pandemic 189\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eNariyoshi Shinomiya\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.1 Advances in Life Science and Technology and the Emergence of ‘So-Called GOF Studies’ to Create ePPPs 190\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.2 Controversy Surrounding GOF Studies on H5N1 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Virus 192\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.3 COVID-19 and GOF Studies on SARS-like Viruses 195\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.4 Ongoing Discussions at the NSABB and Governance by HHS 196\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.5 Future Governance of GOF Research and Prospects 198\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 199\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e16 The Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines 201\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eYang Xue\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1 Relations Between the Hague Ethical Guidelines and the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1.1 Commonality in International Soft Law 202\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1.2 Commonality in Global Public Goods 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.1.3 Effective Multilateralism 203\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.2 BTWC Advances the Formulation of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Responsible Scientific Research 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.2.1 Institutional Basis of BTWC for Responsible Scientific Research 204\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.2.2 BTWC Advances the Development of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Scientific Research 205\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3 Constitution of the Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines: Ideas, Principles, Elements and Path Formation 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3.1 Ideas 207\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3.2 Principles 208\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.3.3 Path Formation 209\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16.4 Future Discussion 210\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 211\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e17 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management 213\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eYuhan Bao and Alonso Flores\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.1 Introduction: Scientists Engagement and Biorisk Management 214\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.2 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management at International Level: Case from IWG Assessment Framework 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.2.1 Building the Culture of Responsibility: The Key Elements and Approaches of Engaging Scientist in Biorisk Management 215\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.2.2 Improving the Culture of Responsibility: Engaging Scientist in the Assessment of Biorisk Management Systems 218\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.3 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in National Institutional Oversight: Case from the Netherlands 219\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.4 Engaging Scientists in Biorisk Management in Community: Case from iGEM 220\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.4.1 Engaging Scientists Through iGEM Safety Rules Checklist and Safety Screening System 221\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.4.2 Engaging Scientists Through iGEM Human Practices Programme 222\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17.5 Conclusion: How to Engage Scientists in Management of Biorisk and Other Emerging Fields 223\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 223\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 224\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e18 The Role of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use 225\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eLeifan Wang\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.1 The Dual-Use Concept and Concerns 226\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2 Ethics as an Instrument on Dual-Use Governance 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2.1 Ethics Promote Responsible Practices on Dual Use 227\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2.2 Limitation of Ethics in Dealing with Dual Use 229\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.3 Existing and Complementary Ethical Guidelines on Dual Use 230\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4 Recent Dual-Use Scenarios 231\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4.1 Synthetic Biology 231\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4.2 Gene Editing 232\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4.3 Neuroscience 232\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.4.4 Digital Biological Data 233\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.5 Ethical Education for Future Dual Use 233\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 234\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e19 Where Is the Governance of Dual-Use Science Going? 237\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eNancy Connell and Gigi Gronvall\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.1 Background: Genetic Technologies and Their Applications 238\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.2 Dual-Use Science: Evolving Story of a Dualistic Term 239\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3 Begin with the Experts: Models of Self-regulation 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.1 From Asilomar to Napa 240\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.2 Tools for Self-regulation: Risk and Benefit Analyses: Useful Frameworks 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.3 A Patchwork of Layered Oversight, from Global to Local 241\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.4 Self-regulation: The Basis of Scientific Enterprise 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.5 Oversight Along the Life Cycle of Research: Universities Are Sites of Layered Governance 243\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.6 Toward an International Model: International Collaboration in Science and Technology (ICST) 244\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.3.7 International Standards for Biosafety and Biosecurity 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.4 Alternative Governance Structures 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.4.1 Hybrid Governance Models 245\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.4.2 Network-Based Governance 246\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.4.3 Transnational Governance 246\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.5 Conclusion 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 247\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 248\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e20 Towards an International Biosecurity Education Network (IBSEN) 251\u003cbr\u003e \u003c\/b\u003e\u003ci\u003eKathryn Millett and Lijun Shang\u003c\/i\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.1 Introduction 252\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.2 The Need for Biosecurity Education, Awareness-Raising and a Culture of Responsibility in the Life Sciences 252\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.3 Past Efforts in Educating Life Scientists and Establishing a Culture of Responsibility 253\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.4 Challenges Faced by Biosecurity Education and Awareness-Raising 258\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5 Comparable Approaches Implemented in Analogous Frameworks in the Nuclear and Chemistry Fields 259\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.1 IAEA Nuclear Security Culture and the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) 260\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.2 Chemical Weapons Convention and the Advisory Board on Education and Outreach (ABEO) 262\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3 Key Lessons from the INSEN and ABEO for an International Biosecurity Educational Network (IBSEN) 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.1 Comprehensive Understanding Learned from Related Initiatives 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.2 A Biosecurity Education Network Must Be Underpinned by Firm and Sustained Commitment from States and the Future Network’s Host Body (Such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention) 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.3 Sustained Financial Support Observed and Maintained 264\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.4 Strategic Vision and Clear Pathways Are Required for Communication and Collaboration Between a Network and Treaty Bodies\/States 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.5.3.5 Diversity of Memberships and Engagement with a Wide Range of Stakeholders 265\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.6 Conclusion 266\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor Biography 267\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences 268\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix A: The Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists 269\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex 273\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Biology, life sciences [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Biology, life sciences\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Biology,%20life%20sciences%20%5BPS%5D%22\"\u003ePS\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Wiley","offers":[{"title":"Brand New","offer_id":52472159273240,"sku":"9781394189014","price":80.79,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/files\/9781394189014.jpg?v=1785719606","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/essentials-of-biological-security-a-global-perspective-hardback-9781394189014","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}