{"product_id":"economics-new-classical-versus-neoclassical-frameworks-hardback-9780631220015","title":"Economics; New Classical Versus Neoclassical Frameworks (Hardback) 9780631220015","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eEconomics\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cfont size=\"5\"\u003eNew Classical Versus Neoclassical Frameworks\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003eXiaokai Yang (Author)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9780631220015, Wiley\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eHardback, published 19 January 2001\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e774 pages\u003cbr\u003e25.2 x 17.8 x 4.6 cm, 1.442 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eThis innovative text ushers in a new way of examining basic economic issues. It teaches economics from a different standpoint, based on specialization and the division of labor. Resource allocation for a given level of division of labor is shown as not the only determination for demand and supply. Levels of division of labor are shown as a major factors as well.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart I: Economic Environment: Introduction:\u003c\/b\u003e. \u003cp\u003e1. What is Economics?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnalytical Framework of Economics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Economics vs. New Classical Economics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStructure of the Text and Different Ways to Use it.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Preference and Utility Function.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eScientific Approach to Studies of Human Behavior.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePreference and Utility Function.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConvex Preference Relation, Quasi-concave Utility Function, Diminishing Marginal Rates of Substitution, and Desire for Diverse Consumption.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOrdinal vs. Cardinal Theory of Utility and Diminishing Marginal Rate of Substitution vs. Diminishing Marginal Utility.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. Production Conditions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Framework vs. New Classical Framework.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Environment of Production.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Classical Production Environment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous cum Exogenous Comparative Advantage.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart II: Neoclassical Framework:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4. Neoclassical Decision Problems.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBudget Constraint and Dichotomy Between Pure Consumers and Firms.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Pure Consumer's Constrained Utility Maximization Problem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Statistics of the Pure Consumer's Utility Maximization Problem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Pure Consumer's Expenditure Minimization Problem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRecovering Utility Function from a Demand System.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRevealed Preference.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Producer's Decision Problem in a Walrasian Regime.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e5. General Equilibrium in the Neoclassical Frameworks.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral Equilibrium in a Walrasian Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical General Equilibrium Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Statistics of Neoclassical General Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWelfare Implications of the Neoclassical General Equilibrium\u003cbr\u003e Equilibrium in Neoclassical Game models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart III: New Classical Framework:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6. Consumer-producers' Decisions to Choose Optimum Level and Pattern of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe New Classical Framework and Transaction Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConfigurations and Corner Solutions in the New Classical Framework.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Optimum Resource Allocation for a Given Level and Pattern of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Optimum Level and Pattern of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical and New Classical Laws of Supply and Elasticity of Substitution.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e7. New Classical General Equilibrium and Its Welfare Implications.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical vs. New Classical General Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Does the Market Coordinate the Division of Labor and Utilize Network Effects.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInframarginal Comparative Statistics of New Classical General Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEfficiency of the Invisible Hand.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e8. Trade Pattern and Professional Middlemen.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Can Professional Middleman Make Money? What Are Determinants for Business Success.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Model with Trading Activities and Heterogeneous Parameters.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDecisions to Be a Professional Middleman.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMarket Structures and Corner Equilibria.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Equilibrium Size of the Network of Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of Professional Middlemen and a Hierarchical Structure of Economic Organization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeterminants of Trade Pattern and Successful Business.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart IV: Institution of the Firm and Pricing through Bargaining and Contracting:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e9. Labor Market and Institution of the Firm.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhat is the Institution of the Firm.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIs It Fair to Have Asymmetric Relationship Between Boss and Employees.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStory behind the Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of the Firm from the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Distinction Between ex ante and ex post Production Functions and the New Classical Analysis of Demand and Supply.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomies of Division of Labor, Economies of the Firm, and Coase Theorem.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e10. Pricing Mechanism Based on Bargaining.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBargaining Game, Strategic Behavior, Opportunistic Behavior.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNash Bargaining Game.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous Transaction Costs caused by Information Asymmetry.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAlternating Offer Bargaining Games.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDynamic Bargaining Game and the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Does Competition for a Greater Share of Gains from the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGenerate Endogenous Transaction Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Can Endogenous Transaction Costs be Eliminated by Consideration of Reputation.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNon-credible Commitment and Soft Budget Constraint.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e11. Endogenous Transaction Costs and Theory of Contract, Ownership, and Residual Rights.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous Transaction Costs and Moral Hazard.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Principal-agent Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical General Equilibrium Model of Principal-agent.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Trade off Between Endogenous Transaction Costs caused by Moral Hazard and Monitoring Cost.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Grossman-Hart-Moore Model of Optimal Ownership Structure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart V: Trade Theory and More General New Classical Models:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e12. Emergence of International Trade from Domestic Trade and Emergence of New Products.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous Trade Theory and Endogenous Number of Consumer Goods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical Trade Model with Fixed Learning Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow are Demand and Supply Functions Determined by Individuals' Levels of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInframarginal Comparative Statistics of the Optimum Decisions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow is the Level of Division of Labor in Society Determined in the Market.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInframarginal Comparative Statistics of General Equilibrium and Many Concurrent Economic Phenomena.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of International Trade from Domestic Trade.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComovement of Division of Labor and Consumption Variety.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrade off Between Economies of Specialization and Coordination Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Neoclassical Model Endogenizing the Number of Consumption Goods on the Basis of the Trade off Between Economies of Scale and Consumption Variety.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAn Extended Murphy-Shleifer-Vishny Model with Compatibility between Economies of Scale and Competitive Market.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e13. Exogenous and Endogenous Comparative Advantages, Division of Labor, and Trade.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous vs. Exogenous Comparative Advantage.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Ricardian Model with Exogenous Comparative Technological Advantage and Transaction Costs.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnalysis of Decisions vs. Analysis of Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomic Development and Trade Policy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Endowment Advantage and Transaction Efficiency.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e14. More General New Classical Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheoretical Foundation of New Classical Economics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA General New Classical Model with ex ante Different Consumer-producers.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Existence of General Equilibrium.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEquilibrium Organism and Efficiency of the Invisible Hand in Coordinating Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Smithian Model with Dual Structure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrade Pattern and Income Distribution.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VI: Urbanization, Population, the Trade off Between Working and Leisure:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15. Urbanization, Dual Structure Between Urban and Rural Areas, and the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy and How Cities Emerge from the Division of Labor?.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of Cities and of the Dual Structure Between Urban and Rural Areas.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Can Geographical Concentration of Transactions Improve Transaction Efficiency.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimultaneous Endogenization of Level of Division of Labor, Location Pattern of Residences, Geographical Pattern of Transactions, and Land Prices.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFujita-Krugman Model of Urbanization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e16. The Trade off Between Work and Leisure and Impacts of the Resource Endowment and Population on the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Can Division of Labor Enlarge the Scope for the Efficient Trade off Between Work and Leisure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Leisure Time and Per capita Consumption of Each Goods Increase as Division of Labor Develops.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhy Can Crisis of Resource Shortage Promote Evolution in Division of Labor and Productivity.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImplications of High Population Density for Evolution in Division of Labor through Its Effect on Per capita Investment Cost of Infrastructure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VII: Trade off Between Economies of Division of Labor and Coordination Reliability of the Network of Division of Labor:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17. Economics of Property Rights and the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUncertainties in Transactions and Economics of Property Rights.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrade offs among Economies of Division of Labor, Coordination Reliability, and Benefit of Competition.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenization of Coordination Reliability in Each Transaction.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubstitution between Precision in Specifying and Enforcing Property Rights and Competition.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e18. Insurance and Risk of Coordination Failure of the Network of Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eUncertainty and Risk Aversion.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Model with Insurance and Endogenous Specialization in the Absence of Moral Hazard.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Division of Labor and Endogenous Transaction Costs caused by Complete Insurance.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart VIII: Hierarchical Structure of Division of Labor:\u003c\/b\u003e.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e19. The Division of Labor in Roundabout Production and Emergence of New Machines and Related New Technology.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Classical View vs. Neoclassical View on the Emergence of New Producer Goods and Related New Technology.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Model with Endogenous Technical Progress, Endogenous Number of Producer Goods, and Endogenous Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Efficient Number of Producer Goods and Level of Specialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Corner Equilibria in 9 Structures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConcurrent Changes in the Level of Division of Labor, Productivity, and Input Diversity.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEx post Production Function, Emergence of New Machines, and Endogenous Technical Progress.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChanges in Economic Structure and Topological Properties of Economic Organism.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvolution in the Number of Producer Goods and Economic Development.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e20. Industrialization and the Division of Labor in Roundabout Production.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Features of Industrialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA General Equilibrium Model Endogenizing Production Roundaboutness.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorner Equilibria and Emergence of New Industry.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorner Equilibria and Emergence of New Industry.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral Equilibrium and Industrialization.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eChanges in the Income Shares of the Industrial and Agricultural Sectors.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Number of Possible Structures of Transactions Increases More Than Proportionally as Division of Labor Evolves in Roundabout Production.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e21. Hierarchical Structure of the Network of Division of Labor and Related Transactions.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Theory of Hierarchy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOne Way Centralized Hierarchy.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Decentralized Hierarchy of Transactions and the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConfigurations and Market Structures.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe General Equilibrium and Its Inframarginal Comparative Statistics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNetwork Hierarchy of Cities and Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePart IX: Economic Development and Economic Growth:.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e22. Neoclassical Models of Economic Growth.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical vs. New Classical Growth Model and Exogenous vs. Endogenous Growth Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Ramsey Model and the AK Model.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eR\u0026amp;D Based Endogenous Growth Models.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e23. Economic Growth Generated by Endogenous Evolution in Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomies of Specialized Learning by Doing and Endogenous Evolution in Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical Dynamic Model with Learning by Doing.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOptimum Speed of Learning by Doing and Evolution of Endogenous Comparative Advantage.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous Evolution of the Extent of the Market, Trade Dependence, Endogenous Comparative Advantages, and Economic Structure.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmpirical Evidences and Rethinking Development Economics and Endogenous Growth Theory.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Relationship between the Control Theory and Calculus of Variations.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e24. Concurrent Endogenous Evolution in Division of Labor, in the Number of Goods, and in the Institution of the Firm.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Can We Simultaneously Endogenize Evolution in Division of Labor and in the Number of Producer Goods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Dynamic Equilibrium Model with Learning by Doing and an Endogenous Number of Producer Goods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDynamic Equilibrium Level of Specialization and Input Variety.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConcurrent Evolution of Specialization, Variety of Producer Goods, and the Institution of the Firm.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix. 24.1. Proof of Lemma 24.1.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix 24.2. Proof of Proposition 24.1.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAppendix 24.3. Proof of Proposition 24.2.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e25. Experiments with Structures of Division of Labor and Evolution in Organization Information Acquired by Society.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHow Does Organization Knowledge Acquired by Society Determine the Level of Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA Static Model with Endogenous Length of Roundabout Production Chain and Endogenous Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInteractions Between Dynamic Decisions and Evolution in Organization Information.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWalrasian Sequential Equilibrium and Concurrent Evolution in Organization Information and Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePart X: Macroeconomic Phenomena and Endogenous Size of Network of Division of Labor:\u003c\/b\u003e .\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e26. Theory of Capital and Saving.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical Theory of Capital.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew Classical Theory of Capital and Savings.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapital and Division of Labor in Roundabout Production.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e27. Money and Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNeoclassical vs. New Classical Theories of Money.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical Model of Endogenous Monetary Regime.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePossible Structures and Monetary Regimes.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e28. New Classical Theory of Business Cycles and Unemployment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRethinking Macroeconomics.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLong-run Regular Efficient Business Cycles, Cyclical Unemployment, Long-run Economic Growth, and Division of Labor in Producing Durable Goods.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA New Classical Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Business Cycles and Unemployment.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCyclical vs. non-cyclical Corner Equilibria.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeneral Price Level, Business Cycles, and Unemployment Rate.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmergence of Firms and Fiat Money from the Division of Labor.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eReferences.\u003c\/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndex.\u003c\/p\u003e\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Economics [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Economics\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Economics%20%5BKC%5D%22\"\u003eKC\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Wiley-Blackwell","offers":[{"title":"Brand New","offer_id":52173687193880,"sku":"9780631220015","price":130.69,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/files\/9780631220015.jpg?v=1781167112","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/economics-new-classical-versus-neoclassical-frameworks-hardback-9780631220015","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}