{"product_id":"designing-federalism-a-theory-of-self-sustainable-federal-institutions-hardback-9780521816182","title":"Designing Federalism; A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions (Hardback) 9780521816182","description":"\u003cfont face=\"Georgia\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"6\"\u003eDesigning Federalism\u003c\/font\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cfont size=\"5\"\u003eA Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThis book argues that a number of institutional variables can be critical in determining federal success.\u003c\/em\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"4\"\u003eMikhail Filippov (Author), Peter C. Ordeshook (Author), Olga Shvetsova (Author)\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e9780521816182, Cambridge University Press\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eHardback, published 12 January 2004\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e396 pages, 10 b\/w illus.  17 tables\u003cbr\u003e23.6 x 15.9 x 3 cm, 0.663 kg\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp align=\"justify\"\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eBecause of the redistributive nature of institutions and the availability of implementable alternatives with different distributive consequences, the desire of federation members to change institutional specifics in their favor is a permanent feature of the federal political process. This is so for two reasons. First, states or their equivalents in democratic federations usually can succeed in renegotiating the rules if they feel sufficiently motivated to do so. Second, in the case of a federation it is more or less clear who stands to benefit from any change in institutions. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium of constitutional legitimacy at the popular and elite levels cannot be taken for granted. The authors show that the presence in the political process of agents who are 'naturally committed' to the status-quo institutional arrangement can suffice to coordinate voters to act as if they support existing constitutional arrangements.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/strong\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003e1. Federations and the theoretical problem: 1.1 Why Federalism\u003cbr\u003e 1.2 Definitions\u003cbr\u003e 1.3 The long search for stability\u003cbr\u003e Federalism as nuisance\u003cbr\u003e Federalism as engine of prosperity\u003cbr\u003e Riker as intermediary\u003cbr\u003e 1.4 The fundamental problem of stability\u003cbr\u003e 1.5 Basic premises and conclusions\u003cbr\u003e 2. Federal bargaining: 2.1 Alliances versus federations\u003cbr\u003e 2.2 The private character of public goods\u003cbr\u003e 2.3 Equilibrium selection and redistribution\u003cbr\u003e 2.4 The 'federal problem'\u003cbr\u003e 2.5 Bargaining for control of the center\u003cbr\u003e 2.6 Allocating jurisdictions\u003cbr\u003e 2.7 Three levels of institutional design\u003cbr\u003e 3. Two cases of uninstitutionalized bargaining: 3.1 The Czechoslovak dissolution\u003cbr\u003e 3.2 The Soviet dissolution\u003cbr\u003e 3.3 The feasibility of success in initial bargaining\u003cbr\u003e 3.4 Secession: the special road to renegotiation\u003cbr\u003e 4. Representation: 4.1 Two alternative models of Federalism\u003cbr\u003e 4.2 A national venue for bargaining\u003cbr\u003e 4.3 Within versus without\u003cbr\u003e 4.4 Direct versus delegated representation\u003cbr\u003e 4.5 Other parameters of design\u003cbr\u003e 4.6 Bilateral decision making and the case of Russia\u003cbr\u003e 5. Incentives: 5.1 Institutional enforcement\u003cbr\u003e 5.2 The court\u003cbr\u003e 5.3 Some simple rules of constitutional design\u003cbr\u003e 5.4 Voters versus elites\u003cbr\u003e 5.5 Desirable imperfection and a democratic as if principle\u003cbr\u003e 6. Political parties in a federal state: 6.1 An extreme hypothesis\u003cbr\u003e 6.2 Parties in a democracy\u003cbr\u003e 6.3 The idealized party system\u003cbr\u003e 6.4 Integrated parties\u003cbr\u003e 6.5 Integration outside the United States\u003cbr\u003e Australian Federalism and the role of parties\u003cbr\u003e Canada\u003cbr\u003e 6.6 India\u003cbr\u003e Leadership incentives\u003cbr\u003e Rank and file incentives\u003cbr\u003e The party and Federalism\u003cbr\u003e 1967 and thereafter\u003cbr\u003e 7. Institutional sources of federal stability I: 7.1 Introduction\u003cbr\u003e 7.2 Level 2 and the federalist\u003cbr\u003e 7.3 Level 3 institutions\u003cbr\u003e 7.4 Australia, Canada, Germany, and India revisited\u003cbr\u003e Germany\u003cbr\u003e Canada\u003cbr\u003e Canada vs Australia and India\u003cbr\u003e 7.3 Local and regional design parameters\u003cbr\u003e 8. Institutional sources of federal stability II: 8.1 Electoral mechanisms and societal structures\u003cbr\u003e Representation\u003cbr\u003e Ethnicity\u003cbr\u003e Defining federal subjects\u003cbr\u003e Number of local jurisdictions\u003cbr\u003e Authority over local governments\u003cbr\u003e 8.2 Bicameralism\u003cbr\u003e Symmetry\u003cbr\u003e Presidential authority\u003cbr\u003e Presidential selection\u003cbr\u003e Electoral connections\u003cbr\u003e 8.3 Level 1 and the scope of the federal mandate\u003cbr\u003e 8.4 Level 0 - things beyond design\u003cbr\u003e 9. Designing Federalism: 9.1 Russia\u003cbr\u003e Electoral arrangements\u003cbr\u003e Regional autonomy\u003cbr\u003e Constitutional matters\u003cbr\u003e Parties and the current status quo\u003cbr\u003e 9.2 The European Union\u003cbr\u003e Background\u003cbr\u003e The role of parties\u003cbr\u003e The puzzle of the collusion\u003cbr\u003e France versus Britain\u003cbr\u003e EU institutional design\u003cbr\u003e 9.4 Conclusion.\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cfont size=\"3\"\u003eSubject Areas: Political economy [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Political economy\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Political%20economy%20%5BKCP%5D%22\"\u003eKCP\u003c\/a\u003e], Political structure \u0026amp; processes [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Political structure \u0026amp; processes\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Political%20structure%20\u0026amp;%20processes%20%5BJPH%5D%22\"\u003eJPH\u003c\/a\u003e], Regional studies [\u003ca title=\"See our other books on Regional studies\" href=\"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/search?q=%22Regional%20studies%20%5BGTB%5D%22\"\u003eGTB\u003c\/a\u003e]\u003c\/font\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c\/font\u003e","brand":"Cambridge University Press","offers":[{"title":"Default Title","offer_id":46005923741976,"sku":"9780521816182","price":48.46,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0730\/2037\/5320\/products\/9780521016483_d40fab85-a2de-4949-8d77-8e43552d9b1e.jpg?v=1691368347","url":"https:\/\/freshlyprintedbooks.co.uk\/products\/designing-federalism-a-theory-of-self-sustainable-federal-institutions-hardback-9780521816182","provider":"Freshly Printed Books","version":"1.0","type":"link"}